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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a prospective client—we’ll call her Samantha Smith—
walks into your office and needs your help.  She was caught shoplift-
ing Zicam and vitamin C tablets from the local Walmart.  Her six-
year-old daughter had the flu, and without health insurance,
Samantha could not afford prescription medication.  A security guard
saw the act, confronted her, and led her back to a small room in the
rear of the store.  The local police arrived after a few minutes and is-
sued her a citation.  According to Samantha, she fully cooperated, con-
fessed on the spot, and personally observed the recovered items—
valued at approximately $20—being placed back on the shelf as she
left the store.
Surprisingly, however, Samantha did not come to you to discuss
her criminal case—all charges were dismissed upon her successful
completion of a criminal diversion program.1  Instead, Samantha
1. Nebraska statute provides for the establishment of voluntary pre-trial diversion
programs as an alternative to formal prosecution proceedings. NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-3601 to -3604 (Reissue 2008).  Matters are referred to the diversion pro-
gram by the county attorney’s office.  Diversion programs typically involve the
payment of program fees, attending educational courses, offering an apology to
the victim, completing community service, and making restitution to the victim
for any losses due to the offense.  Upon successful completion of the diversion
program, the criminal complaint is dismissed. See id. § 29-3603(4).  Eligibility
requirements vary, but generally a first time offender will qualify for diversion as
long as the crime committed was an “eligible offense.”  Theft is typically an eligi-
ble offense. See Lancaster County Adult Diversion Program Eligibility Criteria
and Program Conditions, LANCASTER CTY. ATT’YS OFFICE, http://www.lancas
ter.ne.gov/attorney/pdf/adultpretrial.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/L7BT-98UP];
Adult Felony Diversion Program Information for Applicants, DOUGLAS CTY.
ATT’YS DIVERSION SERV., http://www.judicialdiversion.org/douglas/images/NE_
DOU-InformationSheet.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/S6C2-RVQS]; Sarpy County
Adult Diversion, SARPY CTY. NEB., http://www.sarpy.com/diversion/adult_alco-
hol_diversion.html [http://perma.unl.edu/K5NQ-X8MU].
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wants your advice on a letter she received from an attorney represent-
ing Wal-Mart Stores.  The letter references the shoplifting incident
and demands payment of $200 “in accordance with Nebraska Rev.
Stat. § 25-21,194.”2  The letter further demands the amount be paid
within thirty days, implying further action would be taken upon fail-
ure to do so.  Confusion sets in.  The charges were dismissed and the
stolen items were returned to the store’s shelf without damage.  On
what grounds does Samantha owe the retailer $200?  This must be a
scam, you conclude.
Unfortunately, it’s not a scam—at least not one explicitly prohib-
ited by law.  Millions of these “civil demand” letters are sent by Wal-
Mart and other retailers every year to individuals accused of shoplift-
ing.3  The concept is known as civil recovery4 and is authorized by
state civil shoplifting statutes.5  Retailers often partner with collection
firms to capitalize on their statutory right of recovery.6  Laws author-
izing civil recovery vary greatly from state to state, but in most in-
stances allow for a remedy significantly greater than the value of the
item stolen.7
The Nebraska statute cited by Wal-Mart in its demand letter to
Samantha allows for recovery of property damage, cost of suit, and
even attorney’s fees incurred in bringing an action.8  While Ne-
2. The authors have access to three different form letters sent by the Law Offices of
Michael Ira Asen, P.C., a collection firm that sends civil shoplifting demand let-
ters on behalf of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.  The first letter states, in relevant part:
“As a result of [the shoplifting] incident, you are liable for a civil demand in the
amount of $200.00.  This civil demand is being made in accordance with Ne-
braska Rev. Stat. § 25-21,194, which allows retailers to recover a civil demand as
a result of such incidents.”  Letter from Michael Ira Asen, Counsel for Wal-Mart,
to [Confidential Client], Nebraska Resident (Confidential Date) (on file with au-
thors) [hereinafter Asen Letter 1].  Upon non-payment, a recipient will likely re-
ceive a second letter containing the following language: “Your failure to pay
[$200] may cause Walmart Stores, Inc. [sic] to consider further action to enforce
its rights under the law.”  Letter from Michael Ira Asen, Counsel for Wal-Mart, to
[Confidential Client], Nebraska Resident (Confidential Date) (on file with au-
thors) [hereinafter Asen Letter 2].  The third letter uses language almost identi-
cal to that found in the second.  Letter from Michael Ira Asen, Counsel for Wal-
Mart, to [Confidential Client], Nebraska Resident (Confidential Date) (on file
with authors) [hereinafter Asen Letter 3].
3. See Ann Zimmerman, Big Retail Chains Dun Mere Suspects in Theft, WALL
STREET J. (Feb. 20, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12034703199
6578719.
4. Id. In the United States, civil-recovery statutes are “law[s] that allow store own-
ers to sue a shoplifter for the value of stolen property.  Recovery does not require
that the defendant first be convicted of any criminal charge resulting from the
incident.” Civil-Recovery Statute, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
5. See infra subsection II.A.1.
6. See Zimmerman, supra note 3.
7. See infra subsection II.A.1.
8. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194 (Reissue 2008).
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braska’s law appears fairly straightforward in providing Wal-Mart the
right to recover actual damage sustained, it is unclear on what basis
Wal-Mart derived this suspiciously round amount of $200—particu-
larly where the retailer incurred no actual damage.  Does the law enti-
tle a Nebraska merchant to account for a portion of its overall
expenses related to loss prevention?  Can the demand letter seek an-
ticipated litigation costs and attorney’s fees?  Can a retailer demand
an amount greater than it may be entitled to under the statute?  This
Article concludes the answer is “no” to all of the above, and that retail-
ers’ practice of demanding arbitrary amounts from Nebraskans under
section 25-21,194 is improper, unfair, and deceitful.9
Civil shoplifting demand letters put individuals like Samantha at
a crossroads: pay it out of fear of the threatened or implied conse-
quences, ignore it and hope it simply goes away, or take affirmative
action to challenge the retailer’s demand.  This is a particularly
daunting decision for most recipients given the criminal–civil overlap
and the intimidating nature of the letter itself.  The demand, after all,
is printed on “official” attorney letterhead,10 and asserts the amount
demanded is “in accordance” with state statute.  In this way, the letter
implies payment of the amount stated is required as a matter of law.11
Assuming a recipient is in a position to fight the claim, on what
grounds and through what mechanisms can the demand be chal-
lenged?  And, considering retailers’ misuse of the statute, is legislative
action needed?  This Article addresses these questions by exploring
the origins and nature of civil shoplifting statutes generally, and the
legislative history and intent of Nebraska’s provision specifically.
This Article is intended to serve as a practical blueprint for advising a
client who has received a civil demand letter of this nature.  To this
end, the Article highlights the limitations on recoverable damages
9. The question of the propriety of other states’ laws that permit private entities to
impose what amount to “fines” without due process of law is for another piece;
instead, this Article emphasizes that Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute does not
provide for such penalties, and written demands by retailers seeking lump sum
payments in the name of the statute are improper.
10. See Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1989) (“A debt collection
letter on an attorney’s letterhead conveys authority and credibility.”).
11. Many notorious “scam” letters are written in a comparable fashion and with a
shared intent.  Scammers send official-looking letters hoping the recipient will
believe the claim is lawful and will be intimidated into paying the amount de-
manded.  Comparably, a first-time shoplifter may be led to believe the amount
demanded is a “standard fee”; the tone of Asen’s initial letter certainly supports
such a presumption. See Asen Letter 1, supra note 2.  The potency of a civil shop-
lifting demand letter is intensified by the fact that recipients may be too ashamed
to seek advice from friends and family with whom they may not want to divulge
the fact of their shoplifting incident.  Furthermore, recipients may also believe
their decision whether to pay will affect their criminal case (even if the letter
specifically says otherwise), their credit score, or both.
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under Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute and discusses potential le-
gal claims which could be brought against those who abuse or other-
wise misapply the statutory cause of action.
Part II provides essential background information on civil recov-
ery, with section II.A discussing the general nature and utilization of
civil shoplifting statutes in other jurisdictions and section II.B analyz-
ing Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute and the limitations on recover-
able damages under Nebraska law.  Part III offers analysis and
appraisal of the three options available to letter recipients: ignore it,
pay it, or challenge it.  This Article concludes that while a state-based
consumer claim or a federal extortion-based claim may have merit,
most recipients would be wise to simply ignore the demand and use
the limitations discussed herein to defend the suit if filed.  Lastly,
Part IV highlights retailers’ frequent misuse of Nebraska’s civil shop-
lifting statute and the inadequacy of the legal remedies available for
citizens caught in its web, and thus calls for lawmakers to repeal,
amend, or otherwise make sufficiently clear the proper scope and ap-
plication of the statute.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Civil Shoplifting Statutes Generally
In 2014 alone, shoplifting and other incidents of fraud cost the re-
tail industry nearly $44 billion.12  To combat the problem, states im-
pose harsh penalties for acts involving theft.  In Florida, for example,
shoplifting $10 worth of merchandise can result in sixty days in jail
and up to $500 in court fines and fees.13  Similarly, in Nebraska, shop-
lifting a candy bar can lead to six months imprisonment, $1,000 in
fines, or both.14  In addition to these extreme criminal penalties, all
fifty states have adopted civil shoplifting statutes, which provide re-
tailers a special civil cause of action against individuals who shoplift
from their stores.15  These statutes, which operate independently of
12. National Retail Security Survey 2015, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N., https://nrf.com/re
sources/retail-library/national-retail-security-survey-2015 [https://perma.unl
.edu/73E6-2KBG].  The report further provides that 34.5% of this amount is at-
tributable to theft by employees (shoplifting comprises 38%). Id.  Another report
covering the same period puts the total loss at $42 billion, attributing 42.9% to
employee theft and 37.4% to shoplifting. See Marianne Wilson, Study: Shrink
Costs U.S. Retailers $42 Billion, CHAIN STORAGE AGE (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www
.chainstoreage.com/article/study-shrink-costs-us-retailers-42-billion-employee-
theft-tops-shoplifting [https://perma.unl.edu/3WPY-TFBJ].
13. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 812.014(e)(3)(a) (West 2007); id. § 775.083(1)(e) (West 2010);
id. § 775.082(e)(4)(b) (West 2010).
14. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-518(4) (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2014); id. § 28-106(1)
(Reissue 2008 & Supp. 2015).
15. See Zimmerman, supra note 3.
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and in addition to the respective state’s criminal sanctions,16 have the
stated intent of transferring the costs associated with stolen goods and
theft-prevention measures from the retailer to the shoplifter.17  In this
way, the laws operate as cost-shifting statutes, at least in theory,
making the shoplifter responsible for loss-prevention costs, as opposed
to the merchant (or the merchant’s paying customers).
1. General Authority and Amount Recoverable
The amount of damages recoverable under each state’s civil shop-
lifting statute varies considerably.  Of particular significance with
these state-by-state distinctions is whether and how much the retailer
is able to recover in additional civil penalties—those amounts above
the actual damages18—associated with a particular act of theft.  In
Louisiana, for example, merchants can recover “the retail value of the
merchandise taken . . . plus damages of not less than fifty dollars nor
more than five hundred dollars.”19  These additional civil penalties
16. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(2) (Reissue 2008) (“A conviction under any
statute or ordinance shall not be a condition precedent to maintaining an action
under this section.”).  By not requiring a conviction, not only does civil recovery
proceed with little to no judicial oversight, it makes merchants’ burden of proof
virtually non-existent.  In this sense, civil shoplifting statutes raise the same pro-
cedural concerns decried by opponents of civil forfeiture statutes.  Civil forfeiture
statutes permit the government to seize property it suspects to be involved in
criminal activity and allow law enforcement to keep the property even if no un-
derlying offense is prosecuted, let alone a conviction obtained. See Timothy J.
Ford, Due Process for Cash Civil Forfeitures in Structuring Cases, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 455, 457 (2015).  The government needs only probable cause to seize the
involved property, and since the forfeiture action is in rem—against the property
itself—the owner must intervene and carry the burden of proving forfeiture is
improper. Id. at 961–62.  Civil forfeiture statutes vary from state to state, but
like civil shoplifting statutes, most states’ laws do not require a conviction for it
to take effect.  However, unlike civil shoplifting statutes, most of which have been
in their current form for decades, forfeiture statutes have been targeted for re-
form. See Nichole Manna, With Nebraska Fifth in Receipts from Civil Forfeiture,
ACLU Seeks Reforms, LINCOLN J. STAR (Oct. 20, 2015), http://journalstar.com/
news/local/911/with-nebraska-fifth-in-receipts-from-civil-forfeiture-aclu-seeks/ar-
ticle_9881358b-bd9a-5aca-bc08-cb1620bcd63b.html [https://perma.unl.edu/BYP4-
84H2].  In April, Nebraska abolished civil forfeiture by statute and will now re-
quire a criminal conviction to take property. See L.B. 1106, 2016 Neb. Laws
856–67.
17. See Zimmerman, supra note 3.
18. Actual, direct damages would typically include physical damage to the item
taken, the value of the item if not recovered, or the cost of repackaging the item.
19. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2799.1(A) (2009) (emphasis added); see Ourso v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 998 So. 2d 295, 300 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding a $200 civil pen-
alty even though the accused shoplifter never left the premises and the item was
immediately returned in merchantable condition); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8308(a)(3) (West 2007) (enabling a retailer to recover the retail value of
the merchandise plus $150); CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.5(c) (West 2010) (allowing a
retailer to recover a penalty between $50 and $500, plus costs—on top of the
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are purportedly designed to help offset the general cost of employing
security personnel and maintaining other theft-prevention services.20
Most states also allow for the recovery of court costs and attorney’s
fees.21
In all but one state, convicted shoplifters are subject to two mone-
tary penalties for their crime: the criminal penalty imposed by the
court22 plus the civil penalty demanded by the retailer23 (in addition
to the cost of any actual damage caused, whether paid through the
civil demand or through an order of restitution).  This has potential for
extremely disproportionate results.  For instance, a person convicted
of shoplifting a $10 item in Mississippi could be required to pay a
criminal fine of $1,000;24 a civil penalty of $200;25 the retailer’s rea-
sonable attorney’s fees26 and court costs;27 and be jailed for up to six
retail value of the merchandise, if not recovered in merchantable condition); N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-105 (McKinney 2010) (bifurcating the amount recoverable
by allowing a merchant to recover up to $1,500 for the value of the item if not
returned in merchantable condition, plus a “penalty not to exceed the greater of
five times the retail price of the merchandise or seventy-five dollars,” with an
absolute cap on the penalty of $500).
20. See Palmer, Reifler & Assocs., Shoplifting and Civil Law, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SHOP-
LIFTING PREVENTION, http://www.shopliftingprevention.org/what-we-do/learning-
resource-center/shoplifting-and-civil-law/ [https://perma.unl.edu/RG89-2CC4]
(“Civil theft laws have been enacted by state legislatures to help compensate re-
tailers for the variety of losses, costs and expenses associated with theft and
shoplifting generally, and to cover any legal ‘damages’ associated with these inci-
dents specifically.”); Daniel Singer, Who Is the Victim in Petty Theft?, CHAIN
STORE AGE (June 15, 2015), http://www.chainstoreage.com/article/who-victim-
petty-theft [https://perma.unl.edu/8AXW-X6T7] (“The statutes, generally, re-
present a formulaic accounting of the value of the stolen good(s) as well as re-
coupment of the costs associated with the retailer’s loss prevention program.”).
But see Zachary T. Sampson et al., Tampa Bay Walmarts Get Thousands of Police
Calls. You Paid the Bill., TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 11, 2016), http://www.tampabay
.com/projects/2016/public-safety/walmart-police/?utm_source=fark&utm_medium
=website&utm_content=link [https://perma.unl.edu/2ZV4-8UDA] (discussing
how Wal-Mart keeps security costs low by overburdening local law enforcement
with tasks that would typically be performed by private security).
21. Twenty-eight states’ civil shoplifting statutes specifically provide for the award of
costs and attorney’s fees in the collection of civil remedies involving incidents of
shoplifting. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS (Richard A. Leiter ed., 7th ed.
Interim (Online) Update 2016), https://perma.unl.edu/YG6A-JJ57 (surveying
state civil shoplifting statutes).
22. Shoplifting Laws by State, NAT’L ASS’N FOR SHOPLIFTING PREVENTION, http://www
.shopliftingprevention.org/category/shoplifting-laws-by-state/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/6UKV-N4Y5] (listing the criminal shoplifting statutes for most states).
23. Leiter, supra note 21 (providing the shoplifting civil penalty amount for each
state).
24. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-93(5)(a) (2014).
25. Id. § 97-23-96(1) (2014).
26. Id.  Mississippi’s statute also limits the broad discretion trial courts typically pos-
sess in determining reasonable attorney’s fees to award.  Specifically, subsection
(5) provides “[i]n awarding damages, attorney’s fees, expenses or costs under this
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months.28  Adding to the absurdity, the citizen could be subject to all
of this even if the item is immediately returned to the shelf without
harm.29
Nebraska’s statute is the only state civil shoplifting statute that
does not provide for additional civil penalties;30 instead, its law limits
the damages that can be collected to only those directly resulting from
the particular incident of shoplifting.31  Under Nebraska’s law, how-
ever, the retailer can still seek attorney’s fees and litigation costs with
no limit stated.32
2. Civil Demand Letters
For retailers, the true value in civil shoplifting statutes lies not in
the judgment to which the retailer may be entitled, but rather the
threat of litigation that can be asserted or implied in a pre-suit de-
mand letter.33  Specifically, these statutes expressly authorize, con-
done, and sometimes require34 retailers to send civil demand letters to
alleged35 shoplifters prior to or instead of filing suit.36  In practice, the
section, the court shall not consider the ability of the opposing party to pay such
fees and costs.” See id. § 97-23-96(5).
27. Id. § 97-23-96(1).
28. Id. § 97-23-93(5)(a).
29. Id. § 97-23-96(1) (“The recovery of stolen goods regardless of condition shall not
affect the right to the minimum recovery provided herein.”).
30. See Leiter, supra note 21 (listing the additional civil penalties allowed by each
state’s civil shoplifting statute); see also David Rangaviz, Shoplifting Punishment
Doesn’t Fit the Crime, BALT. SUN (Dec. 3, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.bal-
timoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-civil-recovery-20141203-story.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/DPE2-L2UA] (suggesting other states should follow Ne-
braska’s lead in limiting recovery to actual damages).
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(1)(a) (Reissue 2008).
32. Id. § 25-21,194(1)(a)(iii).
33. As stated by criminal defense attorney Michael M. Wechsler in an article on this
issue: “The stores hope that a good number of people who receive demand letters
will pay them rather than opting for a court hearing.”  Michael M. Wechsler, Civil
Demand Letters, Retail Theft and Recovery, THELAW.COM, http://www.thelaw
.com/law/civil-demand-letters-retail-theft-and-recovery.415/ [https://perma.unl
.edu/P2RC-88YQ]; see Singer, supra note 20 (explaining the efficiency and profit-
ability of pre-trial demand letters); see also infra notes 41–46 (comparing the vol-
ume of demand letters sent to the number of suits actually filed).
34. Under Maryland law, the retailer must send the alleged shoplifter a demand let-
ter “specify[ing] the amount of the civil penalty sought under [the provi-
sion] . . . and explain the method of calculating that amount.” See MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1303(2)(iii) (LexisNexis 2013).  Similarly, retailers in
Mississippi must, prior to initiating suit, send the alleged shoplifter a written
demand. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-23-96(2).
35. A criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to suit under most state statutes. See
Leiter, supra note 21 (thirty-three states specifically provide that a conviction for
shoplifting or theft is not a condition precedent to maintaining an action for civil
recovery; only one state (New Mexico) requires a conviction for shoplifting to im-
pose liability under its civil shoplifting statute).
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letter serves the dual function of (a) notifying the alleged shoplifter
that the retailer has a statutory right to file suit to collect civil penal-
ties and (b) providing the shoplifter an opportunity to avoid suit by
simply cutting a check for the amount demanded.  A demand letter
recently sent to a Nebraska resident reads in relevant part:
[Y]ou were involved in an incident at a Walmart Stores, Inc. [sic] location that
is considered shoplifting, theft or fraud by the state in which the facility is
located.  As a result of this incident, you are liable for a civil demand in the
amount of $200.00.  This civil demand is being made in accordance with Ne-
braska Rev. Stat. § 25-21,194 which allows retailers to recover a civil demand
as a result of such incidents.37
3. Collection of Damages and Penalties Under Civil Shoplifting
Statutes
To harvest the civil penalties authorized by civil shoplifting stat-
utes, retailers typically partner with law firms or collection agencies
that specialize in “civil recovery.”38  These firms, in turn, assume re-
sponsibility for mailing the demand letters, interacting with recipi-
ents, and seeking satisfaction of the demand.  As compensation, the
firm typically keeps between 10%–40% of the payments received.39
Despite the fact these collection firms represent the largest retail-
ers in the country40 and annually send well over 1 million letters as-
serting or implying the threat of legal action,41 they rarely file suit.
36. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(6) (“The fact that an owner of merchandise
may commence an action under this section shall not limit the right of such
owner to demand, in writing, that any person who is liable for damages and costs
under this section remit such damages and costs prior to the commencement of
an action.”).
37. Asen Letter 1, supra note 2.
38. See Zimmerman, supra note 3.
39. See id. (stating Palmer Reifler, a firm specializing in civil recovery, keeps some-
where between 13% and 30% of what it collects); cf. Richard Dunstan, The End of
the Road for Civil Recovery?, JUST. GAP, http://thejusticegap.com/2014/08/end-
road-civil-recovery/ [https://perma.unl.edu/CTF8-MPB2] (stating civil recovery
firms in Britain often take up to 40% of any payments made).
40. For example, Asen claims to serve four of the five largest retailers in the United
States. See About, LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL IRA ASEN, P.C., http://www.asenlaw
.com/about/ [https://perma.unl.edu/5NSH-S9GY].  Asen’s website does not list
precisely which large chains it represents, but for context, the ten largest retail-
ers in 2014 were: Wal-Mart, Kroger Grocery Stores, Costco, Target, The Home
Depot, Walgreens, CVS Caremark, Lowe’s, Amazon.com, and Safeway. Top 100
Retailers Chart 2014, NAT’L RETAIL FED’N, https://nrf.com/2014/top100-table
[https://perma.unl.edu/Q5MZ-3SCR].  Palmer Reifler also specializes in civil
shoplifting penalty collection for major retailers.  See A Civil Recovery Law Firm,
LAW OFFICES OF PALMER REIFLER & ASSOCIATES P.C., http://www.palmer-
reiflerlaw.com/ [https://perma.unl.edu/F44V-LGZ3].
41. See Zimmerman, supra note 3 (reporting Palmer Reifler estimates it sends 1.2
million demand letters per year); Stores Have Free Rein to Recoup Shoplifting
Losses, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/
20131216/RETAIL_APPAREL/131219905/stores-have-free-rein-to-recoup-shop-
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For example, a partner at Palmer, Reifler & Associates (Palmer
Reifler), one of the nation’s largest civil collection firms, estimates the
firm files suit under civil shoplifting statutes only ten times per
year.42  Lord & Taylor, a popular retailer, “never follows up civil-de-
mand letters by suing suspected shoplifters, . . . citing the cost of going
to court.”43  Instead, retailers and their partners utilize civil shoplift-
ing statutes, which some view as a virtual “shakedown,”44 to intimi-
date unrepresented and unsophisticated recipients into paying the
demand.  When the initial demand letter goes unanswered, collection
firms often send additional letters that escalate the threat of litiga-
tion45 or progressively raise the amount demanded to include “pre-
litigation” expenses,46 thus suggesting the firm intends to and even is
preparing for litigation (despite the fact they almost never file suit).
There is little available data indicating what percentage of the de-
mand letters mailed result in payment of the penalty.47  However,
lifting-losses [https://perma.unl.edu/WU25-FXL6] (noting Palmer Reifler sends
out about 115,000 demand letters per month).
42. See Zimmerman, supra note 3.  That means one of every 120,000 letters sent, or
0.000083%, result in suit, assuming the firm actually files ten per year.  Although
a number of cases were identified where Palmer Reifler had been sued by con-
sumers and retailers, no cases were found that had been filed by Palmer Reifler
on behalf of a retailer seeking damages pursuant to a civil shoplifting statute.
43. Id.  Despite never going to court, Lord & Taylor reportedly made $1 million in a
year from its civil recovery efforts, a figure that was a 15% increase from the year
prior. Id.
44. Walter Hanstein III, an attorney from Maine, complained about Palmer Reifler’s
use of civil demand letters as a “shakedown” tool to the Florida Bar; the firm
maintains the letters are more properly characterized as “a first alternative dis-
pute measure.” Id.  While the Florida Bar declined to get involved without gui-
dance from the courts, it did chastise the firm: “[Y]our methods and
professionalism in sending demand letters and subsequent collections activities
are questionable.”  Jason Garcia & Harry Wessel, Lawsuit Slams Practices of
Law Firm Owned by Airport Board Appointee, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 9, 2008),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2008-07-09/news/palmer09_1_reifler-palmer-
civil-recovery [https://perma.unl.edu/5JUA-CLLU].
45. Compare Asen Letter 1, supra note 2, with Asen Letter 2, supra note 2; see Zim-
merman, supra note 3 (describing the practice of sending multiple letters with an
escalating amount to account for “pre-litigation” expenses); Al Norman, Banned
from 4,540 Walmarts, HUFFINGTON POST (June 26, 2015, 3:22 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/al-norman/banned-from-4540-walmarts_b_7147414.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/8F22-NURS] (describing the common three-letter
progression).
46. See Zimmerman, supra note 3.  Somewhat ironically, Asen does not increase the
amount demanded in subsequent letters, believing that doing so would be “goug-
ing.” Id.; see also Singer, supra note 20 (discussing the implications of collection
firms adding attorney’s fees to pre-litigation demands).
47. See Colleen Long, In Focus: Are Shoplifters Being Shaken Down?, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.pressherald.com/2013/12/17/in_focus
__free_rein_for_retailers__are_shoplifters_being_shaken_down__/ [https://perma
.unl.edu/4GGQ-TQFD] (“Retailers don’t divulge how much money they recoup but
use it in part to offset security costs, said Barbara Staib, spokeswoman for the
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given the official nature and threatening tone of the letters, the risks
of non-payment, and the fact that most recipients of the letters are
likely under-informed and lack access to legal representation, one
could assume the hit rate to be substantial.  Even a moderate re-
sponse rate could produce a massive revenue stream for the retailer
and its attorneys—if only 10% of the demand letters sent annually by
Palmer Reifler resulted in payment, the amount collected could exceed
$20 million.48
B. An Overview of Nebraska’s Civil Shoplifting Statute
Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute, codified at section 25-21,194,
has remained unchanged since its adoption in 1987.49  The provision
allows merchants to recover three types of damages: (1) actual dam-
ages sustained as a direct result of the incident, (2) costs of maintain-
ing the action, and (3) attorney’s fees.50  Furthermore, it specifi-
cally provides that retailers, prior to initiating suit, may “demand, in
writing, that any person who is liable for damages and costs un-
der this section remit such damages and costs prior to commence-
ment of an action.”51  Notably, Nebraska’s law permits, but does
National Association for Shoplifting Prevention.”); but see THE EUGENE POLICE
DEP’T: CRIME PREVENTION UNIT, SHOPLIFTING MERCHANT MANUAL 14 (2012),
http://www.eugene-or.gov/DocumentCenter/Home/View/6136 [hereinafter MAN-
UAL] [https://perma.unl.edu/UD9L-BSFC] (“Experience by retailers using similar
laws in other states indicates that if correct procedures are followed, more than
80% of shoplifting suspects will pay the penalty upon the demand.”); Patrick Ros-
sello, A Retailer’s Nightmare: Shoppers and Clerks Who Steal, BALT. SUN (Aug. 5,
1991), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-08-05/business/1991217186_1_shop
lifter-retailer-theft [https://perma.unl.edu/8UZW-AR9M] (reporting on data re-
ceived from the Maryland Retail Merchants Association that “between 35 and 60
percent of the shoplifters will simply pay the fee”).
48. This figure assumes a $200 demand.  Note that a response rate of 80%—as sug-
gested by the Eugene Police Department—would result in revenue totaling
roughly $192 million. See MANUAL, supra note 47, at 14; see also Melissa G. Da-
vis et al., Private Corporate Justice: Store Police, Shoplifters, and Civil Recovery,
38 SOC. PROBS. 395, 396 (1991) (“In states with statutes inviting large exemplary
damages, catching shoplifters can be a profitable activity for a store and its po-
lice.”); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 49, 122 (2004) (comparing criminal prosecution to civil recovery and
noting that civil recovery can be profitable for some businesses).
49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194 (Reissue 2008).
50. Id. § 25-21,194(1).
51. Id. § 25-21,194(6) (emphasis added).  Arguably, the provision does not actually
provide any authority to send the demand letter, given pre-suit demands are al-
ready permissible under common law (as long as the demand is not misleading or
deceptive).  Instead, this paragraph simply preserves such a right in this particu-
lar context, and makes clear that this section does not “limit” a retailer’s right to
send such a letter.  But, why did the legislature feel it necessary to include a
provision that confirms the absence of a limitation?  An alternate reading could
be that the provision was intended to permit a retailer to demand through a pre-
litigation letter all damages and costs for which the shoplifter would be liable if a
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not require, retailers to send a demand letter prior to initiating
suit.52
1. The Origins of Nebraska’s Civil Shoplifting Statute
Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute was introduced as Legislative
Bill (L.B.) 536 and the Judiciary Committee held its first public hear-
ing on the Bill on March 20, 1987.53  The Bill, as originally drafted,
provided retailers a civil cause of action against shoplifters to recover
“[a]ctual property damage or loss sustained as a direct result of the
incident of shoplifting” and “reasonable cost of security personnel” not
to exceed to $150.54  This language aligned with legislation in other
states which permits retailers to recover a “penalty” in addition to ac-
tual damages.55
Testifying in support of L.B. 536 were Fred Stone, the President of
the Retail Merchants Association; John Hanlon, a California represen-
tative from Target Brands, Inc.; Richard Laucks from Shopko Stores,
Inc.; and Russell Raybould, President of the Nebraska-based B&R
Stores, Inc.56  Together, these representatives testified not only to the
rising costs incurred as a result of shoplifting but also to the alleged
positive results that civil shoplifting statutes produced in other juris-
suit was brought (i.e., damages, costs, and attorney’s fees).  Though it would be a
stretch, an argument could be made that subsection (6) serves no true purpose
unless it creates a special right to demand anticipated litigation expenses.  The
corollary to this argument would be that “damages and costs under this section”
was intended to encompass anything for which a shoplifter could be liable at
trial.  The question, then, is whether “damages and costs under this section” in-
cludes all harm suffered by the retailer, including pre-litigation costs and attor-
ney’s fees, or is it limited to damages and costs related to the product stolen, as
described in subsection (i).  Or, is it intended to encompass the damages listed in
subsection (i) and the costs listed in subsection (ii) but not the attorney’s fees
listed in subsection (iii)?
52. Cf. supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing state provisions requiring
demand letters be sent).  Nebraska’s other commonly used civil demand statute,
section 25-1801, requires a written demand be made in writing no less than
ninety days prior to initiating suit. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1801 (Reissue 2008
& Cum. Supp. 2014).
53. Hearing on L.B. 536 Before the Comm. on Judiciary, 1987 Leg., 90th Sess. (Neb.
1987) [hereinafter Hearing].
54. L.B. 536, 1987 Leg., 90th Sess. (Neb. 1987).  Another provision permitted retail-
ers to demand civil penalties from parents or legal guardians for the tortious con-
duct of a minor. Id.  The provision received a lot of interesting commentary from
legislators concerned about the inevitability that the state would be liable to
merchants whenever a state ward was caught shoplifting. Floor Deb. on L.B.
536, 1987 Leg., 90th Sess. (Neb. Apr. 15, 1987).  The guardian-liability provision
passed, but not until an exception precluding recovery from the state was added.
Id.
55. See Leiter, supra note 21 (providing a fifty state survey of state civil shoplifting
statutes).
56. Hearing, supra note 53.
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dictions.57  John Hanlon of Target claimed that California’s civil shop-
lifting statute—passed in 1984—fueled a 29% reduction in juvenile
shoplifting apprehensions.58  Similarly, according to Hanlon, Califor-
nia’s provision reduced juvenile recidivism—at least with respect to
repeat shoplifting offenses—“to zero.”59  Surprisingly, none in attend-
ance challenged these seemingly implausible statistics;60 unsurpris-
ingly, no one testified on behalf of those accused of shoplifting.
2. The Statute as Amended
The Judiciary Committee, prior to advancing L.B. 536 to the floor,
removed the provision that permitted retailers to collect up to $150 in
civil penalties to cover the cost of security personnel,61 noting con-
cerns that $150 would become the “standard cost” demanded by retail-
ers and that such penalties would be oppressive to vulnerable classes,
such as children and senior citizens.62  In doing so, the committee ef-
fectively limited recoverable damages to those sustained “as a direct
result” of the incident of shoplifting.63  The legislation as introduced
and passed on the legislative floor read in full:
(1)(a) Any person who commits the crime of theft by shoplifting as pro-
vided in section 28-511.01 or whose conduct is described by section 28-
511.01 or (b) the parents of a minor who commits the crime of theft by
shoplifting as provided in section 28-511.01 or whose conduct is de-
scribed by section 28-511.01 shall be liable to the owner of the mer-
chandise in a civil action for:
i. Actual property damage or loss sustained as a direct result
of the incident of shoplifting, which may include, but shall not
be limited to, full retail value, cost of repair, or cost of replacement
of the merchandise;
ii. Costs of maintaining the action; and
iii. Reasonable attorney’s fees if such owner has retained the ser-
vices of an attorney in maintaining the action and the action is not
in the Small Claims Court.
(2) A conviction under any statute or ordinance shall not be a condition
precedent to maintaining an action under this section.
(3) Recovery under this section may be had in addition to, and shall not be
limited by, any other provision of law which limits the liability of the
parents for tortious conduct of a minor.  The liability of the parents and
the minor shall be joint and several.
(4) This section shall not prohibit or limit any other cause of action which
the owner of merchandise may have against a person who unlawfully or
wrongfully takes merchandise from the owner’s store or retail
establishment.
(5) Judgments, but not claims, arising under this section may be assigned.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id.  It is unclear what metrics Mr. Hanlon used in providing this testimony.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Floor Deb. on L.B. 536, 1987 Leg., 90th Sess. (Neb. Apr. 15, 1987).
63. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(1)(a)(i) (Reissue 2008) (emphasis added).
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(6) The fact that an owner of merchandise may commence an action under
this section shall not limit the right of such owner to demand, in
writing, that any person who is liable for damages and costs
under this section remit such damages and costs prior to the
commencement of an action.
(7) This section shall only apply to causes of action which accrue after Au-
gust 30, 1987.
(8) For purposes of this section, minor shall mean any individual under
seventeen years of age.
(9) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no parent shall be
liable to the owner of merchandise in a civil action unless such minor is
living with such parent at the time the conduct described by section 28-
511.01 is committed.64
3. Limits on Pre-Litigation Demands Under NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-21,194
Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute expressly preserves retailers’
rights to issue demand letters prior to filing suit.65  Presumably, the
amount a retailer can demand pursuant to the statute is limited to the
extent of the shoplifter’s liability under such statute.66  Thus, in deter-
mining the legality and legitimacy of a retailer’s pre-litigation de-
mand, one must first consider the amount and type of damages that
are—and are not—recoverable under Nebraska’s civil shoplifting
statute.
Section 25-21,194(1)(a)(i) provides that retailers are entitled to
“[a]ctual property damage or loss sustained as a direct result of the
incident of shoplifting, which may include, but shall not be limited to,
full retail value, cost of repair, or cost of replacement of the merchan-
dise.”67  Unlike civil shoplifting statutes in other states or the original
language proposed in L.B. 536, Nebraska’s statute does not provide
authority to charge “penalties” or to seek reimbursement of “general
security costs.”68  Instead, Nebraska’s statute permits only costs in-
64. Id. § 25-21,194 (emphasis added in bold).  The law has remained unchanged since
its adoption.
65. Id. § 25-21,194(6); see also supra note 51 (discussing the underlying purpose of
subsection (6)).
66. A demand that exceeds what is allowed under the law may be deemed unfair or
deceptive and subject to civil penalty. See infra subsection III.C.2 (discussing the
potential applicability of the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act).  An individual
sending such a demand may also be found guilty of extortion. See State v. Hynes,
978 A.2d 264 (N.H. 2009) (holding an attorney’s demand for money amounted to
extortion where the statutory support cited in the demand permitted only recov-
ery of compensatory damages (direct harm), and the attorney had suffered no
direct harm).  If the demand has any basis in the law, however, it may find pro-
tection as First Amendment free speech. See Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923,
939–40 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)) (confirming pre-litigation communications are
protected speech, unless objectively baseless and brought with improper motive).
67. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
68. See id.; L.B. 536, 1987 Leg., 90th Sess. (Neb. 1987).
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curred “as a direct result” of the incident.69  It follows, then, that the
maximum amount of damages recoverable under subsection (i) would
be the full retail value of the merchandise, but only if the item was
damaged beyond repair or was not recovered.  If the item was re-
turned in merchantable condition or the shoplifter ultimately paid for
the item, there are no subsection (i) damages to recover.
Recall the hypothetical client, Samantha Smith, who was caught
stealing $20 worth of merchandise from Walmart, and later received a
civil demand letter seeking $200 in damages “in accordance with [Sec-
tion] 25-21,194.”70  Under subsection (i), Wal-Mart Stores would be
entitled to $200 only if it incurred $200 in damages as a direct result
of Samantha’s actions, which is not supported on the facts.  Because
the items were immediately returned to the shelf in merchantable
condition, Wal-Mart could not include their $20 value in its calcula-
tion of damages.71  What other “damages” were incurred as a direct
result of her actions?  Though the statute does not permit the retailer
to claim general expenses related to security, it could, arguably, at-
tempt to quantify overhead costs expended on this particular incident.
For example, assume it took two security guards—making $15 per
hour—one hour each to apprehend her, complete all the paperwork,
and put the item back on the shelf.72  Presumably, then, Wal-Mart
could claim actual measurable damages resulting from this incident
were roughly $30 all in.73
69. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
70. See supra Part I; Asen Letter 1, supra note 2.
71. Even if Wal-Mart established the items were damaged, tainted, or otherwise un-
sellable, the total amount of damage would be $20, not $200.
72. Since Samantha completed the diversion program, no Wal-Mart employee was
required to leave work to testify at court, nor was it necessary for Wal-Mart to
conduct any further investigation, such as reviewing the video surveillance or
providing a copy of the same to the county attorney.
73. Although a retailer could argue that the hourly wages of any employees forced to
address the shoplifting incident are recoverable as direct damages, the argument
would likely fail.  First, this is not the type of “[a]ctual property damage or loss”
contemplated by the legislature, as is revealed by the few examples provided
therein. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(1)(a)(i).  Moreover, the retailer would
have difficulty establishing the incident resulted in the payment of a greater
amount of wages than would have been paid absent the incident, where the se-
curity personnel are paid hourly and the expense would have been incurred re-
gardless.  A different result may be found, however, if the retailer paid a
commission or bonus to the employee who spotted or apprehended the shoplifter.
See Barbara Huber, The Dilemma of Decriminalization: Dealing with Shoplifting
in West Germany, CRIM. L. REV. 621, 627 n.11 (1980) (contrasting an award paid
to an employee for detecting a shoplifter, for which a shoplifter would be liable,
with the cost of hiring additional staff to deal with theft, which cannot be recov-
ered as damages from the thief).  However, such compensation policies are rarely
used, if not extinct.  In fact, Wal-Mart policies now prohibit employees, other
than management or asset-protection personnel, from stopping or apprehending
a shoplifter caught in the act. See It Doesn’t Always Pay to Be a Shoplifter
2016] CIVIL SHOPLIFTING DEMANDS 43
That said, Wal-Mart is likely not calculating its demands on a
case-by-case basis; instead, Wal-Mart has perhaps determined the ar-
bitrary amount of $200 to be the “sweet spot”—enough to be lucrative,
but not so much that a recipient is likely to consider contacting legal
counsel before paying it.74  One could imagine Wal-Mart testing out
other amounts, such as $10075 or $300, concluding $200 had the best
overall payout.  Just as likely, Wal-Mart may demand $200 because it
thinks it’s entitled to it—after all, many state statutes permit retail-
ers to recover at least $200 in penalties regardless of the damage sus-
tained.76  Nevertheless, neither of these “justifications” authorize the
Superhero, LAWYERS.COM, http://labor-employment-law.lawyers.com/human-re-
sources-law/it-doesnt-always-pay-to-be-a-shoplifter-superhero.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2016) [https://perma.unl.edu/5CDS-W5LH].  This follows the policy Wal-
Mart unveiled in 2006, which relaxed its previous “prosecute everybody” policy,
and discourages prosecution for thefts of items under $25. See Michael Barbaro,
Wal-Mart Eases Policy on Petty Shoplifters, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/07/13/business/worldbusiness/13iht-wal-mart.2190898.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/K84M-T7G7].
74. A similar strategy is employed by “Patent Trolls”—companies and their attorneys
who file thousands of frivolous suits claiming infringement of their patent. See
Patent Troll, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/patent-troll
.asp [https://perma.unl.edu/Q3ML-UD64].  For a satirical observation of the prac-
tice, see Last Week Tonight, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents (HBO),
YOUTUBE (Apr. 19, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA
[https://perma.unl.edu/Y7X9-QT6Q].  These companies rarely follow through
with litigation, but instead aim to collect an amount of money the victim per-
ceives to be less than the cost of legal fees to defend the claim. Id. at 5:52 to 6:40.
These companies, like those sending out civil demand letters to Nebraskans, util-
ize the fear of potential legal costs to extort money from those who are either not
in a position to know their rights or are making a calculated decision to pay out
the “moderate amount” demanded in order to avoid the cost of defending them-
selves in a suit—a cost which will greatly exceed the amount demanded.
75. See PALMER, REIFLER & ASSOCS., CIVIL THEFT DEMAND AMOUNTS (2006), http://
www.accesstps.com/sites/operations_lp/Case%20Forms/2015%20CIVIL%20De
mand%20with%20US%20Statutes%20+%20Intl.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
GJ5D-PLLB] (indicating that in 2006 Palmer Reifler identified $100 as the typi-
cal demand amount in Nebraska).
76. See supra subsection II.A.1.  Retailers and their legion of collection firms may
also be operating under the guidance of a response letter issued by the Office of
the Nebraska Attorney General in 2001, which indicated a retailer could seek in a
demand letter more than just the amount of lost merchandise, e.g., “additional
employee, insurance and anti-theft devices.”  Letter from Don Stenberg, Ne-
braska Attorney General, to [Undisclosed Party], Attorney at Law (May 11, 2001)
(on file with authors).  The letter is not a Nebraska Attorney General Opinion
Letter, but instead appears to have been sent in response to an attorney’s inquiry
into the legality of a $200 civil demand sent by a retailer (or collection firm) to his
or her client, who had apparently stolen $4 worth of merchandise. See id. The
attorney general’s response does not reference Nebraska’s civil shoplifting stat-
ute; in fact, it does not mention shoplifting at all. See id. Instead, it more gener-
ally opines that a demand for money is an offer of settlement—an offer that the
recipient can either accept or reject. Id. On that ground, it appears, the attorney
general found the matter required no further inquiry.  The actual contents of the
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$200 amount Wal-Mart demanded from Samantha Smith, particu-
larly considering the unique limitations of Nebraska’s statute.
Discussed in more detail below are two other possible bases for the
$200 figure.  First, it is conceivable that Wal-Mart and its attorneys,
in ignorance of the history of Nebraska’s law, derived the $200 figure
as an amount reasonable to reimburse a portion of the millions of dol-
lars it spends nationally on general loss-prevention efforts and shop-
lifting-related product shrinkage.  Alternatively, perhaps the $200
figure aims to seek preemptive litigation costs, e.g., the costs of filing
suit and attorney’s fees it could recover if it filed suit.  The subsections
below provide an argument for why these grounds also fail to support
Wal-Mart’s $200 demand.
a. General Loss-Prevention Costs
Many civil shoplifting statutes have the intent of shifting the fi-
nancial burden associated with stolen goods and theft-prevention
measures from the retailer to the shoplifter.77  To this end, most stat-
utes expressly permit retailers to demand not only the full retail value
of the damaged or stolen merchandise, but also a general civil pen-
alty—in some states, up to $500—to help offset the cost of theft-pre-
vention measures, such as surveillance cameras and security
personnel.78  Nebraska’s statute is unique, however, in that its plain
text and legislative history preclude recovery of general theft-preven-
tion costs.
Pursuant to section 25-21,194(1)(a)(i), individuals accused of shop-
lifting in Nebraska are civilly liable to the owner of the merchandise
for “[a]ctual property damage or loss sustained as a direct result of the
incident of shoplifting, which may include, but shall not be limited to,
full retail value, cost of repair, or cost of replacement of the merchan-
demand letter are unknown.  Arguably, if the demand letter simply sought the
payment of $200 for damages incurred, and did not cite the statute in support of
the amount claimed, then the letter, as the attorney general apparently found,
was merely an offer to settle a claim for conversion.  Nebraska’s civil shoplifting
statute does not limit a retailer’s right to bring a common law conversion claim,
nor does it limit its right to seek settlement of such claim prior to filing suit.  A
plaintiff may make a demand or even seek damages in suit in an amount greater
than he may be entitled as long as such claim has some objective basis. See supra
note 66.  If, on the other hand, the referenced letter demanded $200 pursuant to
section 25-21,194, considering the attorney general’s expressed view on indirect
damages, it is likely the attorney general’s office was simply uninformed of the
statute’s legislative history.  Were this the case, it would further support the plea
for statutory amendment to clarify the limitations of the damage provision. See
infra section IV.B.
77. See Zimmerman, supra note 3; see also supra subsection II.B.1 (discussing how
Nebraska’s originally proposed bill included a damage provision that accounted
for “reasonable cost[s] of security personnel”).
78. See supra subsection II.A.1.
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dise.”79  The use of “actual” and “direct result” suggest general and
indirect theft-prevention costs are not recoverable under the statute.
As further evidence of this notion, the listed examples of possible
“losses sustained” are narrowly restricted to acute loss: full retail
value, cost of repair, or cost of replacement of the merchandise.80  Al-
though the provision also includes the boilerplate “which may include,
but shall not be limited to” language, the examples listed thereafter
all pertain to damage to “the merchandise” as a result of “the
incident.”81
Whereas Nebraska’s statute provides clear authority to recover
damages “as a direct result of the incident of shoplifting,”82 the law
contains no provision permitting retailers to account for broader theft-
prevention costs in calculating recoverable damages.  The plain lan-
guage of the statute seems to leave little room for squabble as to the
intent of the legislature in this regard.  Nevertheless, any conceivable
uncertainty would be unmistakably resolved upon review of the stat-
ute’s legislative history.83  Most notably, the Judiciary Committee,
prior to advancing L.B. 536 to the floor, amended the Bill to remove
the provision that would have allowed retailers to recover the “reason-
able cost of security personnel” not to exceed $150.84
Senator Gerald Chizek, a sponsor of Nebraska’s civil shoplifting
statute, provided several reasons for removing the $150 penalty provi-
sion when he introduced the Bill on the floor of the legislature.85  Sen-
ator Chizek noted the Judiciary Committee’s concern “that the $150
79. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(1)(a)(i) (Reissue 2008) (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Nebraska courts may look to legislative history to resolve issues of statutory in-
terpretation when the text is unclear or ambiguous. See Synergy4 Enters. v. Pin-
nacle Bank, 290 Neb. 241, 244–45, 859 N.W.2d 552, 556 (2015) (“In order for a
court to inquire into a statute’s legislative history, the statute in question must
be open to construction, and a statute is open to construction when its terms re-
quire interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous.”).  It is hard to
imagine how the relevant language of section 25-21,194 could be open to con-
struction, but even if it were, the law permits a court to browse the legislative
history to verify the lawmakers’ intent. See Georgetowne Ltd. P’ship v. Ge-
otechnical Servs., Inc., 230 Neb. 22, 28–29, 430 N.W.2d 34, 39 (1988) (“When
asked to interpret a statute, the Supreme Court must determine and give effect
to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire lan-
guage of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.  It is our
duty to discover, if possible, legislative intent from the statute itself.  One of the
fundamental principles of statutory construction is to attempt to ascertain the
legislative intent and to give effect to that intent.  To ascertain the intent of the
Legislature, a court may examine the legislative history of the act in question.”
(citations omitted)).
84. Hearing, supra note 53.
85. See Floor Deb. on L.B. 536, 1987 Leg., 90th Sess. (Neb. Apr. 15, 1987).
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maximum cost would probably become the standard.”86  Further,
charging $150 beyond the actual damages sustained, the committee
reasoned, “would be oppressive to the [sic] two of the most vulnerable
groups, children and perhaps senior citizens.”87  To illustrate these
potentially “oppressive” results, Senator Chizek described a situation
in which a child could shoplift $10 worth of merchandise and be sad-
dled with a $150 civil penalty.88  Similarly a senior citizen could ab-
sentmindedly place a small item in his or her purse or pocket: “This
senior citizen would not only suffer the destruction of their good name
but could have been taxed with costs up to $150.”89  Notably, this $150
civil penalty would be in addition to whatever fine or penalty was im-
posed in the criminal proceeding.
The plain text of section 25-21,194 and the relevant legislative his-
tory make clear the civil shoplifting statute provides no authority for
merchants to claim or attempt to recover damages for general theft-
prevention costs.  Applying this reasoning and conclusion to
Samantha Smith’s case, Wal-Mart’s demand for $200 “in accordance
with Nebraska Rev. Stat. § 25-21,194”90 is unsupported by the statute
if any portion of the amount is attributed to general security expenses
incurred by Wal-Mart.
b. Anticipated Litigation Expenses
The collection of preemptive litigation costs is likewise not author-
ized by Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute.  First, section 25-
21,194(a)(1)(iii) provides for attorney’s fees only “if such owner has re-
tained the services of an attorney in maintaining the action . . . .”91
Without any action having been maintained, there can be no attor-
ney’s fees to claim or court costs to recover.  Moreover, the provision
allowing demand letters (section 25-21,194(6)) mentions pre-litigation
recovery of “damages” and “costs”—noticeably absent is any reference
to attorney’s fees.92
The statute permits retailers to send a letter to the alleged shop-
lifter demanding that “damages and costs” relating to the incident be
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Asen Letter 1, supra note 2.
91. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(a)(1)(iii) (Reissue 2008) (emphasis added).  The term
“maintain” imports the existence of a cause of action. Maintain, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990); see also infra note 281 (discussing the term further).
92. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(a)(6) (“The fact that an owner of merchandise may
commence an action under this section shall not limit the right of such owner to
demand, in writing, that any person who is liable for damages and costs under
this section remit such damages and costs prior to the commencement of an ac-
tion.” (emphasis added)).
2016] CIVIL SHOPLIFTING DEMANDS 47
paid “prior to commencement of an action.”93  It is unclear to what
“costs” this subsection refers.  Subsection (1) discusses “costs” only
twice: in (i) it describes the “cost of repair, or cost of replacement of the
merchandise”;94 and in (ii) it lists “[c]osts of maintaining the action.”95
Arguably, if there is no action filed, there can be no “costs of maintain-
ing the action,” so the only costs to which subsection (6) could refer is
the “costs” listed in subsection (i), which describe the potential loss
sustained as it pertained to “the merchandise” stolen.96
Even if “costs” was interpreted more broadly, it certainly would not
include attorney’s fees.  First, attorney’s fees are not identified by the
statute as a “cost,” but are instead listed entirely separate from the
provisions addressing damages and costs.97  Moreover, the imposition
of or demand for preemptive attorney’s fees, or even those fees actu-
ally incurred in making the demand, would be improper prior to the
commencement of suit.  In Nebraska, the award of attorney’s fees is
generally inappropriate except where provided by statute,98 and even
then, only if pleaded and proven in a civil action.99
Illustrative of this point is section 25-1801,100 a general civil de-
mand statute, which provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees in cer-
tain civil actions where damages do not exceed $4,000, and only when
specific conditions are satisfied.  The statute expressly sets forth when
attorney’s fees are recoverable: when the defendant refuses to pay a
demand for payment within the time proscribed by statute, and the
plaintiff thereafter secures a judgment on the claim.101  Under this
93. Id.
94. Id. § 25-21,194(a)(1)(i).
95. Id. § 25-21,194(a)(1)(ii).
96. Id. § 25-21,194(a)(1)(i).
97. See id. § 25-21,194(a)(1)(iii); see also Wetovick v. Cty. of Nance, 279 Neb. 773,
797, 782 N.W.2d 298, 318 (2010) (“The term ‘costs’ in a statute is not generally
understood to include ‘attorney fees.’”).
98. Blacker v. Kitchen Bros. Hotel Co., 133 Neb. 66, 273 N.W. 836, 838 (1937) (“The
general rule in this state as to the allowance of attorneys’ fees has been stated by
this court as follows: ‘It is the practice in this state to allow the recovery of attor-
neys’ fees only in such cases as are provided for by law, or where the uniform
course of procedure has been to allow such recovery.’” (quoting Higgins v. Case
Threshing Mach. Co., 95 Neb. 3, 144 N.W. 1037, 1039 (1914))).
99. Haley v. Fleming, 148 Neb. 407, 27 N.W.2d 626 (1947) (finding a party must
plead and prove conditions precedent to be entitled to allowance of an attorney’s
fee).
100. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1801 (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2014); see infra section
IV.A (discussing section 25-1801).
101. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1801; see also Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 8:11-
cv-00436-JFB-TDT, at *21 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 2016) (“Nebraska law does not author-
ize collection of interest or attorney fees absent a judgment.”); cf. Hage v. Gen.
Serv. Bureau, 306 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (D. Neb. 2003) (“[The defendant] admits
that it recovered attorney fees, costs and interest without obtaining a judgment.
The court finds as a matter of law that Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25–1801 does not permit
collection of amounts in excess of the debt without first obtaining a judgment.
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statute, even if the claimant files suit, attorney’s fees are not recover-
able if the defendant pays the demand (and costs) prior to the judg-
ment being entered.102
Conversely, the civil shoplifting statute specifically permits
“[r]easonable attorney’s fees if such owner has retained the services of
an attorney in maintaining the action . . . .”103  Thus, although a
favorable “judgment” is not an expressly identified prerequisite to an
award of attorney’s fees under section 25-21,194, both section 25-
21,194 and section 25-1801 require, at the least, the filing of a civil
action before attorney’s fees are recoverable.104  The deliberate action
taken by the legislature in identifying when attorney’s fees are recov-
erable under sections 25-1801 and 25-21,194 demonstrates its intent
that attorney’s fees not be recoverable prior to “maintaining the ac-
tion,”105 and thus inclusion of such fees in a pre-suit demand is inap-
propriate, misleading, and unconscionable.106
III. ADVISING THE CLIENT
As discussed, a recipient of a civil demand letter of the type re-
ceived by Samantha Smith has three options: pay the amount de-
manded, ignore the letter entirely, or preemptively file suit.  Paying
the demand may provide peace of mind, but doing so will cost them
$200 and reward the retailer for its abuse of the civil shoplifting stat-
ute.  Ignoring the letter is the no-cost and low-risk option, but if the
retailer does file suit, the recipient of the letter could incur costs that
far exceed the original $200 demanded (namely, liability for the re-
tailer’s attorney’s fees).  If the particular circumstances call for pre-
emptive action, the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act or a
declaratory action (or both) may provide relief.  The following sections
[The defendant’s] practice of routinely collecting these amounts in reliance on the
statutory grant contained in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1801 is a violation of the
FDCPA.”).
102. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1801.
103. Id. § 25-21,194(a)(1)(iii) (Reissue 2008).
104. Once suit is filed, attorney’s fees can certainly be accounted for in any settlement
negotiations; that is a matter for the parties to decide.  For a court to order attor-
ney’s fees, however, the retailer would have to be deemed a “prevailing party.”
See infra subsection III.B.2.
105. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(a)(1)(iii).
106. In the context of the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, the “collection of any
amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principle
obligation)” amounts to an unconscionable or unfair means of collecting a debt
“unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt
or permitted by law.” See 15 U.S.C § 1692f(1) (2012).  It follows then that where
Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute does not permit pre-suit attorney’s fees, an
attempt to collect such fees prior to filing suit would be similarly unconscionable
if not more so.
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analyze these options and conclude ignoring the letter and defending
the claim if filed is the best choice in most scenarios.
A. Pay the Demand
The easy option is to simply pay the demand, despite the fact that
the amount likely exceeds what is allowed under the law.107  In ex-
change for $200, the client purchases peace of mind—the threat of
civil litigation and additional liability is reduced to zero.  Further-
more, as noted below, $200 is a fraction of what the merchant could
potentially recover were it to actually file suit, win, and be awarded
costs and attorney’s fees on top of any actual damages.  Settlement
offers the ability to cap damages at $200; but, to many people accused
of shoplifting, if not most, acquiring $200 within the window pre-
scribed would require major sacrifice (it could even encourage further
criminal activity).  Additionally, paying $200 to a retailer who is not
entitled to it, when the chances of actually being sued are infinitesi-
mal,108 may be a relatively high price to pay for peace of mind.109
B. Ignore the Demand
The pros and cons of ignoring the demand letter are virtually oppo-
site of those listed above: if the client ignores the letter and refuses to
107. See supra subsection II.B.3.
108. See supra note 42.
109. If paying the full $200 is not feasible or agreeable, one could propose settlement
in an amount greater than $0 but less than $200. See Wechsler, supra note 33
(“It is not uncommon for the store and shoplifter to settle for less than the
amount demanded.  The store may also agree upon a payment plan.”).  However,
the authors could find no record of demand letter recipients making such an offer,
nor could there be found any indication of whether retailers or their agents would
be receptive to offers in amounts below what was demanded.  Simply “lawyering-
up” may also be a path to achieving peace of mind short of paying the demand.
Matthew C. Hug, a New York criminal defense attorney, suggests an alternative
approach:
[C]ontact an attorney . . . and alert them that you have received this
letter.  When I have represented individuals that have received one of
these letters, I contact Michael Ira Asen, and tell him that my client will
not be paying, to send all further correspondence directly to my office
and that if they wish to proceed to collection, that they can commence a
legal action.  I have NEVER received a summons notifying me that my
client was going to be sued for not paying this civil penalty.  Nor have I
ever been contacted again by his office (or any other law firm doing the
same type of work).
Matthew C. Hug, Convicted of Petit Larceny and Received Letter, HUG LAW,
PLLC, https://www.huglaw.com/convicted-petit-larceny-received-letter-attorney-
walmart-demanding-pay-civil-penalty-must-pay/ [https://perma.unl.edu/KC36-
GW45].  Both of these options should be considered as possible alternatives.
Each has the potential to provide increased peace of mind but also runs the risk
of poking the proverbial sleeping bear.  Given the unpredictability of each,
neither option will be discussed further in this Article.
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pay, the merchant could sue at any point within the four-year statute
of limitations,110 and, if it did so, the client may be liable for damages,
costs, and attorney’s fees—an amount that could justify seeking bank-
ruptcy protection.111  The odds of a retailer filing suit, however, are
extraordinarily slim considering retailers almost never do so.112  In
fact, a search of available Nebraska electronic court filings spanning
from 1996 through 2015 produced zero actions filed by Wal-Mart (or
any major retailer) pursuant to section 25-21,194.113  Suit is also un-
likely given the practical and economic considerations.  First, the cost
of taking the matter to judgment is certain to exceed the damage
amount claimed.  Because entities typically cannot file in small claims
court,114 the action would need to be filed in county or district court
110. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-212 (Reissue 2008) (noting Nebraska’s statute of limitations
for unspecified claims).
111. Under most circumstances, a debt associated with a shoplifting civil demand
could be discharged through bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012)
(describing debts which are non-dischargeable).  Typically, an award of attorney’s
fees is dischargeable where the judgment associated with such attorney’s fees is
dischargeable unless the conduct warranting attorney’s fees violates one of the
provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). See Kaplan v. Wasko, No. CC-12-1118-PaMkBe
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. Mar. 6, 2013); see also KEVIN RUSER & DEANNA LUBKEN, NE-
BRASKA CHAPTER 7 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE MANUAL § 3 (2012) (discuss-
ing generally when bankruptcy may be appropriate, as well as what debts may be
dischargeable).
112. See supra subsection II.A.3; Cory Hurley, Civil Recovery Rarely Leads to Court:
Lawyer, W. STAR (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.thewesternstar.com/News/Local/
2012-03-30/article-2943091/Civil-recovery-rarely-leads-to-court%3A-lawyer/1
[https://perma.unl.edu/X9HZ-KN89] (describing why suit is rarely filed in the
context of Canada’s civil shoplifting statutes); Kylie McGivern, Local Lawsuit
Filed Against Home Depot for Accusing Woman of Shoplifting, KXAN (Nov. 24,
2015, 9:01 PM), http://kxan.com/2015/11/24/local-lawsuit-filed-against-home-de
pot-for-accusing-woman-of-shoplifting/ [https://perma.unl.edu/T3L8-EW6L] (re-
porting on a civil claim filed by an alleged shoplifter against Home Depot and
discussing why retailers rarely file suit to recover shoplifting civil penalties).
113. A search performed between January 26, 2016 and March 6, 2016, using the Ne-
braska.gov “Trial Case by Name” subscription-based search platform querying all
civil cases filed between 1996 and present revealed no suit filed pursuant to sec-
tion 25-21,194 by any of the following major retailers: Wal-Mart, Target, Shopko,
CVS Pharmacy, Walgreens, J.C. Penney, Sears, Kohl’s, Home Depot, Lowe’s,
Menards, and Hobby Lobby. See JUSTICE Case Search, NEBRASKA.GOV, https://
www.nebraska.gov/justice/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
114. State statutes creating “small claims” courts most often disallow attorney repre-
sentation.  See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2803(2) (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp.
2014) (“No party shall be represented by an attorney in the Small Claims
Court . . . .”).  Nebraska law further provides that self-representation by an entity
is an unauthorized practice of law. See Back Acres Pure Tr. v. Fahnlander, 233
Neb. 28, 443 N.W.2d 604 (1989).  Although Nebraska’s small claims statute ap-
pears to provide an exception to this rule, it is not clear how such an exception
can be reconciled with laws prohibiting such practice. Compare NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-2803(3) (Nebraska’s small claims statute) (“A corporation shall be repre-
sented by one of its employees.”), with NEB. CT. R. § 3-1003 (2015) (“No nonlaw-
yer shall engage in the practice of law in Nebraska . . . .”), and NEB. REV. STAT.
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(incurring up to $82 in filing fees)115 in the county where the shoplift-
ing occurred or where the shoplifter can be found.116  The retailer
must retain local counsel, carrying a potential price tag in the hun-
dreds, if not thousands.  Moreover, the defendant would need to be
located and served, costing another $25 to $50,117 assuming he or she
can be served by the sheriff.  After accomplishing all this, the retailer
must then prove it is actually owed the amount claimed, which, as this
Article provides, would be difficult if not impossible.118
Even if the retailer obtains an all-out victory, either through de-
fault or on the facts, the costs of obtaining that victory will have cer-
tainly exceeded the amount claimed.  Although the statute provides
for attorney’s fees to be tacked on to the judgment, courts are often
hesitant to award significant attorney’s fees in matters such as
these.119  Even assuming arguendo that a court would enter a judg-
ment for the entire amount claimed ($200 in Samantha Smith’s case),
plus costs and attorney’s fees, what is gained by the retailer?  The re-
tailer would incur substantial internal expense (well beyond the $200
claimed) to investigate the matter and bring it to judgment, including
paying employees to review security footage and to testify in court.
Plus, any amount collected beyond the $200 would be absorbed by the
actual litigation costs and attorney’s fees incurred.  Therefore, in
Samantha Smith’s case, Wal-Mart’s best-case scenario, if it filed suit,
would undoubtedly be a net loss.  Further, any judgment obtained
could be discharged in bankruptcy before a cent was collected,120 leav-
ing the retailer with significant legal fees121 and nothing to show for
it.  Other factors likely to deter retailers from filing suit are the bad
publicity it could create as well as the possibility of exposing to the
§ 7-101 (Reissue 2012) (prohibiting the unlicensed practice of law) (“[N]o person
shall practice as an attorney or counselor at law, or commence, conduct or defend
any action or proceeding to which he is not a party . . . in any court of record of
this state, unless he has been previously admitted to the bar by order of the Su-
preme Court of this state.”).
115. Filing Fees and Court Costs, NEBRASKA.GOV, https://supremecourt.nebraska.gov/
4800/filing-fees-and-court-costs [https://perma.unl.edu/6YTR-E27F].
116. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-403.01 (Reissue 2008).
117. See, e.g., County Sheriff, Service Fees and Mileage, LANCASTER CTY., http://lancas
ter.ne.gov/sheriff/civil/fees.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2016) [https://perma.unl.edu/
G5LH-UXSQ]; Civil Fees, DOUGLAS CTY. SHERIFF’S OFFICE, http://www.douglas
countysheriff.org/civil/fees.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/L9L8-E6GV].
118. See supra subsection II.B.3.
119. For a more extensive discussion on attorney’s fees, see infra subsection III.B.2.
120. See supra note 111.
121. A firm representing the retailer is likely to earn a fee regardless of the outcome,
unless the matter is taken on contingency.  Thus, it is possible a firm could sug-
gest litigation if it favored its own interests to the detriment of its clients.
Though one should not proceed on a strong assumption that a firm would act in
this manner, it should not be ruled out when calculating the probability of a re-
tailer following through on its threat of suit.
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courts and legislature the lucrative practice of abusing Nebraska’s
civil shoplifting statute.
Although it is highly unlikely a retailer would follow through on
the threat of suit, it remains a possibility.  For this reason, subsection
III.B.1 provides strategic considerations and available mechanisms for
an attorney tasked with defending a civil shoplifting claim, and sub-
section III.B.2 addresses concerns related to potential liability for at-
torney’s fees.  Subsection III.B.3 includes a brief discussion on the
potential impacts to one’s credit rating.
1. Defending a Claim
As previously noted, it is doubtful a retailer will file suit under sec-
tion 25-21,194.  In the event of the improbable, the strongest and most
straightforward defense would be the statute’s limitation on what
damages are recoverable.122  As previously discussed, the plain lan-
guage of the statute read in conjunction with the legislative history
should provide ample support for an argument that, on facts similar to
those in the Samantha Smith hypothetical, the retailer suffered no
actual damage under the statute.123  Depending on the pleadings, the
claim could be disposed of on a motion to dismiss124 or motion for sum-
mary judgment.125  A partial summary judgment or declaratory judg-
ment on the issue of what damages are permitted under the statute
could resolve the matter without the need for significant discovery.  If
damage to the merchandise was sustained, and such amount had not
already been recovered by the retailer through direct payment or res-
titution, one might consider making an offer of judgment for the full
retail value of the item(s).126  This may reduce the likelihood or
amount of attorney’s fees being awarded.  A counterclaim under one of
the state or federal causes of action discussed below should also be
122. See supra subsection II.B.3.
123. See supra subsection II.B.3.
124. If the complaint asserts a claim pursuant to section 25-21,194, and does not al-
lege damage to the merchandise taken or loss sustained as a direct result of the
incident, the complaint should be dismissed. See NEB. CT. R. PLDG. § 6-1112
(2015).
125. Summary judgment would be proper where Wal-Mart pleaded actionable damage
but failed to produce evidence exhibiting the damage or loss set forth in section
25-21,194.
126. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-901 (Reissue 2008) (“The defendant in an action for the
recovery of money only, may, at any time before the trial, serve upon the plaintiff,
or his attorney, an offer in writing to allow judgment to be taken against him for
the sum specified therein. . . . If the plaintiff fails to obtain judgment for more
than was offered by the defendant, he shall pay the defendant’s cost from the
time of the offer.”).
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considered.127  To limit both the costs of litigation and the amount of
attorney’s fees for which the client may be liable, however unlikely,
efforts should be made to expedite the trial process and limit
discovery.
2. Liability for Attorney’s Fees
It may seem counterintuitive or perhaps even offensive, but a re-
tailer could be awarded attorney’s fees under the statute even if it ob-
tained a judgment for only a portion of the total amount claimed in the
demand.  For instance, if the retailer convinced a court to award it $10
for the cost of relabeling the stolen item, or $30 in damages for the
wages paid to security personnel involved in the arrest,128 this could
warrant an award of the entirety of attorney’s fees incurred in ob-
taining such judgment.129  For this reason, exposure to liability for
paying the retailer’s attorney’s fees may be the most significant factor
to be considered when weighing the risks of ignoring the letter.
Under Nebraska law, when a statute provides for reasonable attor-
ney’s fees, “the amount of the fee is addressed to the discretion of the
trial court . . . .”130  When exercising its discretion in awarding attor-
ney’s fees, trial courts consider two primary factors: (1) the time and
labor spent on the case; and (2) the customary charges for such ser-
127. See infra section III.C.  Many of the risks associated with affirmatively challeng-
ing the demand are not present in a counterclaim because litigation has already
been initiated at this point.
128. See supra subsection II.B.3 (discussing how a retailer may attempt to attribute
the hourly wage paid to a security guard for the time spent on the apprehension
of a shoplifter to damages, and concluding such an attempt would be unsuccessful
under section 25-21,194).
129. Any judgment—no matter how small—could entitle a retailer to attorney’s fees
as the “prevailing party.” See, e.g., Twin Towers Condo. Ass’n v. Bel Fury Inv.
Grp., 290 Neb. 329, 340, 860 N.W.2d 147, 160 (2015) (defining “prevailing party”
as one who “receive[s] a judgment in its favor”); In re Estate of Stuchlik, 289 Neb.
673, 691–92, 857 N.W.2d 57, 72 (2014) (noting one need not be “100 percent suc-
cessful,” but rather “substantially successful” in order to be entitled to attorney
fees); cf. DocMagic, Inc. v. Mortg. P’ship of Am., 729 F.3d 808, 812 (8th Cir. 2013)
(applying Missouri law) (“A ‘prevailing party’ is one who obtains a judgment from
the court, regardless of the amount of damages.”). But see supra subsection II.B.3
(discussing the difficulty in proving actual damages when the product is returned
to the shelf unharmed).  Moreover, despite the availability and lawfulness of at-
torney’s fees under the statute, an award of attorney’s fees in an amount suffi-
cient to motivate a retailer or a law firm to pursue the matter remains unlikely.
Courts in Nebraska are reluctant to award attorney’s fees even when provided for
by statute; and even when attorney’s fees are awarded, it is often in an amount
significantly less than what was sought.
130. Eicher v. Mid Am. Fin. Inv. Corp., 270 Neb. 370, 381, 702 N.W.2d 792, 806 (2005).
The trial court utilized the Lodestar Method in determining reasonable attorney’s
fees; on appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court found the trial court had not
abused its discretion in doing so. Id. (“[The trial court’s] ruling will not be dis-
turbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”).
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vices.131  This is known as the “Lodestar Multiplier” or the “Lodestar
Method,” and although not expressly adopted by the Nebraska Su-
preme Court,132 it is the common measure.  This method is only a gen-
eral framework, however, and other factors may be considered to
increase or decrease the amount owed.  These factors include: “the na-
ture of the litigation, the novelty and difficulty of the questions raised,
the skill required to properly conduct the case, the responsibility as-
sumed, the care and diligence exhibited, the result of the suit, and the
character and standing of the attorney.”133  Although the civil shop-
lifting statute provides no limitation on the amount of attorney’s fees
that can be awarded, courts would likely take into consideration the
amount of the judgment in determining the reasonableness of the
fee.134  As a guidepost, a court could look to section 25-1801, which
provides for attorney’s fees in certain claims involving disputes not
exceeding $4,000 and proscribes specific limits on what can be
awarded (capped at $10 plus 10% of the judgment).135
3. Impact on Credit Rating
There is often fear that non-payment of a civil demand may nega-
tively impact the recipient’s credit report.136  It would be improper,
however, for a merchant or collection firm to report the claim to a
credit reporting agency.  Negative credit reports stem from outstand-
131. Id. at 383, 702 N.W.2d at 807.
132. See id. at 383, 702 N.W.2d at 806–07 (acknowledging that the Nebraska Supreme
Court has never expressly adopted the Lodestar Method but nonetheless ac-
cepting them as the primary factors under Nebraska case law for determining
attorney’s fees).
133. Id. at 383–84, 702 N.W.2d at 807. Eicher involved a case where the Nebraska
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees at a level 30%
above the Lodestar amount based on these extraneous factors. Id.  It follows that
if a trial court may use its discretion to increase fees for a complex case that is
admirably performed by respected attorneys, it may decrease fees for a simple
case where it believes the prevailing party acted undesirably.
134. There would also be a persuasive argument for a reduction in attorney’s fees
given the simplicity of the suit and the low level of skill required to litigate the
matter, as well as the disparity between the amount demanded and the judgment
obtained (e.g., if the retailer demanded payment of $200, and obtained a judg-
ment for only $30 in actual damages).
135. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1801 (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2014) (“Attorney’s
fees shall be assessed by the court in a reasonable amount but shall in no event
be less than [$10] when the judgment is [$50] or less and when the judgment is
over [$50] up to [$4,000] the attorney’s fees shall be [$10] plus [10%] of the judg-
ment in excess of [$50].”).
136. Some collection firms contribute to this fear by alluding to the impact on one’s
credit score in the demand letter itself. See Zimmerman, supra note 3 (describing
a “final notice” one recipient received that included language that her “credit rat-
ing may be adversely impacted” if she did not pay).
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ing debt,137 and these demand letters—often by their own terms138—
are not an attempt to collect a debt.139  If a claim based on a shoplift-
ing civil demand were to be discovered on a credit report, further in-
vestigation should be performed into whether the conduct was in
compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act.140
C. Affirmative Legal Challenges
In light of the demand letter’s facially deceptive and misleading
reference to Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute, recipients of civil de-
mands like that received by Samantha Smith should evaluate possible
claims against the retailer.  From a societal perspective, a judicial rul-
ing may be the only way to get large retailers and collection firms to
stop abusing and misusing Section 25-21,194.
This section provides a practical overview of possible affirmative
actions and legal challenges that can be brought against retailers,
their counsel, or both; namely claims under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA),141 the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO),142 and the Nebraska Consumer Protection
Act (NCPA).143  This section also analyzes the viability and usefulness
of seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying the amount of damages
recoverable under Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute.
137. Margaret Reiter, Getting Debt Collectors to Remove Negative Information from
Your Credit Report, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/getting-debt-
collectors-remove-negative-information-from-your-credit-report.html [https://per
ma.unl.edu/NBE5-UXA3].
138. Although not probative, let alone determinative, collection firms attempt to dis-
suade Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims by including language in demand
letters—often capitalized, in bold print, or both—that the letter is not an attempt
to collect a debt. See, e.g., Asen Letter 1, supra note 2; Asen Letter 2, supra note
2; Asen Letter 3, supra note 2.
139. See infra subsection III.C.1.i (discussing the inapplicability of the Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act to matters involving the collection of civil penalties).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).  Negative entries on consumer credit reports are pre-
mised on the existence of a debt.  Thus, claiming demand letters are not a “debt”
for Fair Debt Collection Practices Act purposes, but are for credit report pur-
poses, is an attempt by merchants and collection firms to have their cake and eat
it too. See Matthew J. Ruff, What to Do with the “Civil Demand Letter” in a Shop-
lifting Case, TORRANCE ATT’Y (May 11, 2012), http://thetorranceattorney.com/
2012/05/11/what-to-do-with-the-civil-demand-letter-in-a-shoplifting-case/ [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/7XUH-PLMX] (“There have been instances where the store will
go so far as to place a negative entry on the accused[’s] credit report, though this
is rare and probably illegal unless you agreed to pay the amount or conceded the
debt in some other manner.”).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012).
143. NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1609 (Reissue 2010).
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1. Federal Challenges
Recipients of civil demand letters have brought federal challenges
under both the FDCPA144 and RICO.145  While these claims have
been decisively unsuccessful to date, and a claim under FDCPA is
likely foreclosed, analysis of these federal challenges provides some
insight into what set of facts could provide relief under federal law.
a. Fair Debt Collections Practices Act
The FDCPA provides legal remedies for consumers subjected to
abusive debt collection practices.146  A cause of action under the
FDCPA must be premised on the existence of a “debt,” which the stat-
ute defines as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to
pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property,
insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction are pri-
marily for personal, family, or household purposes.”147  The FDCPA
itself is silent on whether an attempt to collect a civil penalty for dam-
ages allegedly sustained from shoplifting or theft amounts to a “debt,”
but current law suggests that it does not.148
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1692; see Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinksy, Brewster & Neider, 111 F.3d
1322, 1326 (7th Cir. 1997); Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Grp., 834 F.2d 1163 (3d
Cir. 1987); DirecTV v. Milliman, No. 02-74829, 2003 WL 23892683 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 26, 2003); Coretti v. Lefkowitz, 965 F. Supp. 3 (D. Conn. 1997); Riebe v.
Juergensmeyer & Assocs., 979 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Shorts v. Palmer,
155 F.R.D. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
145. 18 U.S.C. § 1961; see Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler & Assocs., 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356
(S.D. Fla. 2010).
146. 15 U.S.C. § 1692.
147. Id. § 1692a(5).
148. See, e.g., Zimmerman, 834 F.2d at 1167–69 (holding that the defendant’s offer to
settle a civil claim arising from an alleged theft of services is not a “debt” for
purposes of the FDCPA); see also Bass, 111 F.3d at 1326 (holding that the FDCPA
is limited to obligations arising from consensual transactions); Coretti, 965 F.
Supp. 3 (same); DirecTV, 2003 WL 23892683 (holding the FDCPA does not apply
to incidents arising from alleged shoplifting incidents); Shorts, 155 F.R.D. at 175
(same); Riebe, 979 F. Supp. 1218 (same); ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW
CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION § 4.4.2.3, at 165 n.689 (8th ed. 2014) (describing the
Federal Trade Commission’s narrow view of the word debt, opining that civil
shoplifting claims are not a “debt”). But cf. Hansen v. Ticket Track, Inc., 280 F.
Supp. 2d 1196, 1202 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (involving a demand by parking lot
owner claiming “violation fees” resulting from theft of services considered a
“debt” within the meaning of the FDCPA); Thies v. Law Offices of William A.
Wyman, 969 F. Supp. 604, 607 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (expressing the Ninth Circuit’s
rejection of Zimmerman to the extent it construes a FDCPA-invoking transaction
to require “an offer or extension of credit”); H.R. Rep. No. 95-131, at 4 (1977)
(providing FDCPA drafters’ intent that “the term ‘debt’ include consumer obliga-
tions paid by check or other non-credit consumer obligations”).  In some in-
stances, retailers have been known to require alleged shoplifters, while detained,
to sign a document agreeing to pay the civil penalty.  Although it would seem
such promise to pay would turn the tort-based penalty into a consumer debt,
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The Third Circuit considered the application of the FDCPA to civil
penalties in Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group.149  In Zimmerman,
cable network providers sent civil demand letters to approximately
5,600 Philadelphia residents who, according to the providers, were un-
lawfully pirating microwave television signals.150  The letters in-
formed the recipients they were in violation of the law, and pursuant
to section 705 of the Federal Communications Act of 1984, potentially
liable for $10,000 in civil damages.151  The letter threatened litigation
will follow unless the recipients: (1) removed the unauthorized equip-
ment, (2) signed an agreement to cease illegal reception, and (3) paid
the network’s non-negotiable $300 civil demand.152  A recipient of the
civil demand letter filed suit alleging, among other claims, that the
cable network providers violated the FDCPA by sending a letter that
contained “numerous false or misleading representations.”153  Af-
firming the trial court’s dismissal, the Third Circuit held that penal-
ties arising from alleged torts are not debts under the FDCPA, and are
therefore not covered by the Act’s restrictions on debt collection prac-
tices.154  In reaching its decision, the court concluded that Congress
intended to protect consumers from debt collectors, not to protect al-
leged tortfeasors from claimants.155  The court also noted that, to be
actionable under the FDCPA, the plaintiff must show that the alleged
debt arose out of a “transaction” between the consumer and the collec-
tor.156  Although the FDCPA does not explicitly define “transaction,”
the court interpreted the word as “involving the offer or extension of
credit to a consumer.”157  This definition—coupled with the Third Cir-
cuit’s interpretation of “debt”—necessarily foreclosed the plaintiff’s
claim under the Act.158
courts have been reluctant to view it that way. See Grimard v. Palmer, Reifler &
Assocs., No. 07-CV-12128, 2007 WL 2287831, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2007)
(finding a settlement agreement arising from an alleged tort (shoplifting) does
not create a consumer “debt” for purposes of the FDCPA).
149. 834 F.2d 1163.
150. Id. at 1166.
151. Id. at 1165–66.
152. Id. at 1166.
153. Id. at 1167.
154. Id. at 1168–69 (“We find that the type of transaction which may give rise to a
‘debt’ as defined in the FDCPA, is the same type of transaction as is dealt with in
all other subchapters of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, i.e., one involving
the offer or extension of credit to a consumer.  Specifically it is a transaction in
which a consumer is offered or extended the right to acquire ‘money, property,
insurance, or services’ which are ‘primarily for household purposes’ and to defer
payment.”).
155. Id. at 1167.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1168.
158. Notably, the Seventh Circuit in Bass limited its adoption of Zimmerman by dis-
tinguishing traditional acts of theft (i.e., stealing cable or shoplifting) from the
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Several federal district courts have reached a similar conclu-
sion.159  In Shorts v. Palmer,160 for example, a federal district court in
Ohio rejected an FDCPA complaint alleging unfair debt collection
practices by an attorney for Rite Aid Pharmacy.161  There, the plain-
tiff received a civil demand letter after he attempted to shoplift two
boxes of cigars—valued at $1.74—from an Ohio Rite Aid.162  The de-
mand letter, citing Ohio’s civil shoplifting statute, threatened litiga-
tion unless the plaintiff paid $106.59.163  The plaintiff filed suit,
alleging that Rite Aid’s counsel failed to provide information or other-
wise advise him of his right to dispute the debt or obtain verification
as is required under the FDCPA.164  In rejecting this claim, the trial
court—citing the Third Circuit’s holding in Zimmerman—noted, “[A]n
obligation to pay money is not a debt unless it is incurred by a ‘con-
sumer’ and it ‘aris[es] out of a transaction . . . .’ ”165  Because the plain-
tiff-shoplifter was not a “consumer” and the shoplifting incident was
not a “transaction,” the court granted the defendant’s motion to
dismiss.166
consensual transaction of providing a check in exchange for goods or services.
Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinksy, Brewster & Neider, 111 F.3d 1322, 1326 (7th Cir.
1997).  Similarly distinguishing the two acts, the Tenth Circuit found FDCPA
violations where a law firm attempted to collect civil shoplifting penalties from
consumers who had written bad checks.  Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1120
(10th Cir. 2002) (“By seeking to collect a shoplifting penalty where no shoplifting
(as the term is defined by Utah statute) occurred, Riddle sought to collect an
amount not permitted by law in violation of the FDCPA.”).  Putting aside the
technical limitations of the FDCPA, it is questionable as a matter of policy why
an individual who steals by writing a bad check should receive protection, while
an individual who takes merchandise without writing a check is not.  In both
scenarios, the “theft” could be inadvertent (forgetting how much money was in
the checking account or accidentally forgetting an item of merchandise in the
bottom of the shopping cart) or intentional (knowing there was no money in the
account or intentionally stealing an item), yet only recovery for the “white collar”
theft is subject to the limitations of the FDCPA.
159. See Coretti v. Lefkowitz, 965 F. Supp. 3 (D. Conn. 1997); see also DirecTV v. Mil-
liman, No. 02-74829, 2003 WL 23892683 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 26, 2003) (holding that
the FDCPA does not apply to claims arising from alleged shoplifting incidents);
Shorts v. Palmer, 155 F.R.D. 172 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (same); Riebe v. Juergen-
smeyer & Assocs., 979 F. Supp. 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that an obligation
to pay a fine arising from an overdue library book is not a debt for purposes of the
FDCPA).
160. 155 F.R.D. 172.
161. Id. at 176–77.
162. Id. at 173.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 174.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 176.
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b. Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
RICO makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, inter-
state or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity.”167  To prevail under RICO, the plaintiff must
establish: (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of
racketeering activity.168  On the right set of facts, recipients of civil
demand letters in Nebraska could have a valid claim under RICO.
The strength of a RICO claim turns largely on the fact-specific alle-
gations in the plaintiff’s complaint, including the injuries sustained169
and the named defendant’s role and relationship with other entities of
the RICO enterprise.  To prevail under RICO a plaintiff must prove,
among other elements, the defendant engaged in at least two acts of
prohibited conduct, or “racketeering activity,”170 which range from
wire and mail fraud to bribery and extortion.171  In addition to racke-
teering activity, there must be an “enterprise,” which in the context of
civil recovery requires a factual examination into the relationship be-
tween the retailer, its counsel, and other third parties.172  The highly
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2012).
168. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 2006).
169. Injury itself is a prerequisite to RICO liability. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2012).
Section 1964(c) provides that such injury must be to “business or property,”
which at least one federal circuit court has interpreted as excluding mental
anguish. Id.; Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Grp., 834 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1987)
(“The named plaintiff has alleged only injury in the nature of mental distress, not
an injury ‘in his business or property.’  Therefore he has no cause of action on a
RICO claim . . . .”).
170. To sustain RICO liability, the plaintiff must prove a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity.  A pattern of unlawful racketeering activity requires “at least two acts of
racketeering activity” as enumerated in Section 1961(1) of the Act. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1), (5) (2012).  It should be noted, however, that although the Act explicitly
permits the “pattern” to be premised on two acts of racketeering activity, the Su-
preme Court has cautioned that two isolated acts may not be sufficient for liabil-
ity to attach. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985)
(“As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a ‘pattern of racke-
teering activity’ differs from the other provisions in § 1961 in that it states that a
pattern ‘requires at least two acts of racketeering activity,’ § 1961(5) (emphasis
added), not that it ‘means’ two such acts.  The implication is that while two acts
are necessary, they may not be sufficient.”).
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); see also Elliott v. First Sec. Bank, 249 Neb. 597, 608, 544
N.W.2d 823, 832 (1996) (noting that, with respect to racketeering activity, RICO
requires that the defendant’s state of mind be the same as that required in a
criminal prosecution).
172. An “enterprise” under the Act includes “any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity.”  18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).  For liability purposes,
the defendant in a RICO claim is not the entity itself, but rather a “person” em-
ployed with or associated with that enterprise. Id. § 1962(c).  Thus, to establish
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factual nature of these inquiries makes it difficult to assess a potential
claim in broad terms.
Only one federal court has addressed the substantive elements of a
RICO claim in a challenge to a law firm’s issuance of civil shoplifting
demands.  In Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler & Associates,173 the plaintiff-
class alleged the law firm, in partnership with retailers, local co-coun-
sel, and a web-based fee collection company, “use[d] a system that al-
low[ed] it to manipulate and control civil theft collection threats to
consumers and conceal the true facts about the collection.”174  Plain-
tiffs further alleged that the law firm controlled and operated a RICO
enterprise by: (1) collecting consumer information from retailers, (2)
providing that information to a web-based management company for
processing, (3) engaging local attorneys who affixed their names on
the form demand letters without attorney review, (4) sending out mil-
lions of demand letters through the U.S. mail, and (5) engaging online
databases to create automated systems for collecting money.175
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
holding the plaintiffs failed as a matter of law to prove that the defen-
dant-law firm was “separate and distinct” from the other parties of the
alleged enterprise,176 and that it participated in the “operation or
management” of that enterprise.177  The court applied a broad agency
analysis in reaching its decision, finding the law firm acted “as an
agent for its retailer clients and therefore was not a separate and in-
liability under Section 1962(c), “one must allege and prove the existence of two
distinct entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an ‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same
‘person’ referred to by a different name.”  Cedric Kushner Promotions v. King,
533 U.S. 158, 158 (2001).
173. 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
174. Id. at 1377.
175. Id. at 1377–78.  The court further summarized the plaintiffs’ RICO allegation as
follows:
Plaintiffs say the firm decided who to send demand letters to, yet it hired
so few lawyers that a factual and legal analysis of the circumstances
surrounding any particular demand letter was impossible.  The firm
charged attorneys’ fees for legal work it did not perform.  The firm cre-
ated a network of “of counsel” attorneys in other states who signed de-
mand letters that were generated in Florida, but those “of counsel”
attorneys could not even look at the file if they wanted to before the let-
ters were sent out.  Plaintiffs cite the firm’s proposal for civil recovery
services sent to prospective clients as evidence that legal services took a
back seat to the firm’s collection services.
Id. at 1379–80.
176. Id. at 1378.  The alleged enterprise in Kelly consisted of the Palmer Reifler Law
Firm, the retailers that contract with the firm to collect civil penalties, local co-
counsel, and web-based communication firms that facilitate the issuance of civil
demand letters. Id. Palmer Reifler was the only RICO defendant.
177. Id. at 1380; see also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993) (holding that
RICO liability attaches only where the defendant plays some role—even a mini-
mal one—in directing the affairs of the enterprise).
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dependent entity.”178  Similarly, with respect to the “operation and
management” requirement of RICO liability, the court noted the de-
fendant provided “traditional legal services” to its retail clients, and
therefore had no role in the direction of the enterprise.179
The Eighth Circuit has similarly held that a lawyer or law firm is
shielded from RICO liability in the performance of traditional or “run-
of-the-mill” legal services.180  The court has also held, however, that
“[b]ehavior prohibited by § 1962(c) will violate RICO regardless of the
person to whom it may be attributed,” and that an attorney may be
liable when “he crosses the line between traditional rendition of legal
services and active participation in directing the enterprise.”181  This
distinction between traditional legal services and active participation
in unlawful conduct emphasizes the case-by-case nature of such analy-
ses, and highlights the critical role of individualized fact-finding in
discovery.  To overcome the particular hurdles that foreclosed the
RICO claim in Kelly, Samantha Smith, our hypothetical client, would
need to show not only that the defendant-entity is separate and dis-
tinct from the other entities of the enterprise, but also that it partici-
pated in its operation or management.182
2. Nebraska Consumer Protection Act
The NCPA provides a cause of action to “[a]ny person who is in-
jured in his or her business or property”183 as a result of “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce”184
which directly affect the people of the State of Nebraska.185  A number
of questions emerge in considering the viability of an NCPA claim in
response to a civil demand letter: Does an alleged shoplifter have
standing to sue under a consumer protection act?  Is the issuance of a
letter demanding money in excess of amounts authorized by the cited
statute an “unfair” or “deceptive” business practice?  Does the act of
sending the civil demand letter constitute “trade or commerce”?  And
finally, do these demand letters affect the public interest?  This sec-
178. Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1379.
179. Id. at 1380–81.
180. Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1348 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[A] growing number of
courts, including our own, have held that an attorney or other professional does
not conduct an enterprise’s affairs through run-of-the-mill provision of profes-
sional services.”).
181. Id.
182. The authors recognize that the Kelly court’s analysis was limited in that it ad-
dressed only one element (of many) required for a RICO claim.
183. NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1609 (Reissue 2010).
184. Id. § 59-1602 (Reissue 2010).
185. Id. § 59-1601(2) (Reissue 2010); see also Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 258
Neb. 678, 684, 605 N.W.2d 136, 141–42 (2000) (“To be actionable under the CPA,
therefore, we conclude that the unfair or deceptive act or practice must have an
impact upon the public interest.”).
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tion explores these questions and concludes that, on the facts present
in the Samantha Smith hypothetical, an NCPA claim against a re-
tailer or its counsel could find success.
a. Standing to Sue Under the NCPA
The purpose of the NCPA is to “provide consumers with protection
against unlawful practices.”186  Thus, an important interpretative
question is whether an alleged shoplifter has standing to file suit
under the Act.  In other words, is the NCPA available only to those
traditionally identified as “consumers,” or to anyone who suffers direct
harm as a result of the business practices prohibited under the Act?
Nebraska courts have yet to specifically address whether alleged shop-
lifters have standing under the state’s consumer protection law, but
the plain language of the statute indicates they would.187
The text of section 59-1609—which specifically defines the class of
persons entitled to bring suit under the NCPA—provides, “Any person
who is injured in his or her business or property by [unfair or decep-
tive business practices] . . . may bring a civil action in the district
court.”188  The term “person” is further defined by the statute as “nat-
ural persons, corporations, trusts, unincorporated associations, part-
nerships, and limited liability companies.”189  Moreover, while the
term “consumer” appears in the title of the Act and in sections that
address substantive conduct, it is absent from provisions identifying
or limiting who can file suit.
A Florida district court considered the issue under Florida’s con-
sumer protection law in Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler & Associates.190  Indi-
viduals accused of shoplifting brought suit against Palmer Reifler,
alleging, among other claims, that the law firm violated Florida’s De-
ceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), which prohibits
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive business prac-
tices.191  Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged receiving civil demand let-
ters that gave a “false impression” the firm was evaluating the matter
and preparing for litigation against individual recipients and would
186. See, e.g., Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 267 Neb. 586, 597, 676 N.W.2d 29, 37 (2004)
(emphasis added).
187. See, e.g., Moats v. Republican Party of Neb., 281 Neb. 411, 420, 796 N.W.2d 584,
593 (2011) (“In assessing the meaning of a statute, we are guided by the principle
that in the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given
its plain and ordinary meaning; an appellate court will not resort to interpreta-
tion to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and
unambiguous.”).
188. NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1609 (emphasis added).
189. Id. § 59-1601(1).
190. 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
191. Id. at 1371–72; see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204(1) (West 2010).
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file suit if the demand was not paid.192  Palmer Reifler moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing in part that the plaintiff-class, as shoplifters,
lacked standing under the FDUTPA because they had not purchased
services or goods from the firm, and were therefore not “consumers”
for the purposes of the FDUTPA.193  The trial court rejected the defen-
dant’s motion, citing section 501.211(2), which regulates who can
bring suit under the state’s consumer protection law.194  The court
noted that, prior to 2001, the provision expressed that a suit could be
brought “by a consumer.”195  In 2001, however, the legislature
amended the provision, replacing the term “consumer” with “per-
son.”196  This change, the court reasoned, evidenced lawmakers’ intent
to expand FDUTPA claims to consumers and non-consumers alike.197
The text of section 59-1609 of the NCPA—like the provision at issue in
Kelly—provides “[a]ny person” may bring a civil action for violations of
the substantive provisions of the Act.198  In fact, neither “consumer”
nor “transaction” can be found in section 59-1609.199
Moreover, the Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted a seemingly
broad interpretation of the NCPA, generally, and of section 59-1609,
specifically.  In Arthur v. Microsoft Corp.,200 for instance, a plaintiff-
class sued Microsoft under the NCPA for allegedly monopolizing com-
puter operating systems in Nebraska.201  Microsoft, in its motion for
summary judgment, argued that the plaintiff-class lacked standing
under the NCPA because they (the plaintiffs) were “indirect purchas-
ers” of the software—that is, they purchased the software from a
third-party retailer and not from the corporation directly.202
The trial court granted Microsoft’s motion for summary judg-
ment.203  In doing so, the court cited section 59-829, which requires
192. Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Id. (citing 2001 Fla. Laws. ch. 2001–39 § 6 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 501.211(2) (West 2010) as described)).
197. Id. at 1373 (“We agree with these latter cases.  Applying a liberal construction to
§ 501.211(2), as we are compelled to do when construing the provisions of
FDUTPA . . . we see no reason not to conclude that replacing the term ‘consumer’
with ‘person’ served to broaden the reach of the statute so that more than just
consumers could avail themselves of the protection of this statute.”).
198. NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1609 (Reissue 2010); see also Panag v. Farmers Ins., 204
P.3d 885, 890 (Wash. 2009) (citing the phrase “any person” in its consumer pro-
tection statute as support for its holding that plaintiffs could maintain a claim
under the act since “it is not necessary to establish any consumer relationship,
direct or implied, between the parties”).
199. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1609.
200. 267 Neb. 586, 676 N.W.2d 29 (2004).
201. Id. at 589, 676 N.W.2d at 32.
202. Id. at 592, 676 N.W.2d at 34.
203. Id. at 591, 676 N.W.2d at 33.
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courts to construe state antitrust laws that are “the same as or similar
to” federal laws in a manner consistent with federal precedent.204  Be-
cause the provision of the NCPA at issue corresponded to federal anti-
trust law, the trial court looked to—and relied on—Supreme Court
precedent holding that “indirect purchasers” lack standing under the
Sherman Act.205  The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed, holding that
indirect purchasers have standing to sue under the NCPA notwith-
standing conflicting federal precedent.206  In reaching its decision, the
court noted that a contrary holding—one denying standing to indirect
purchasers—would defeat the purpose of the Act.207  “The Act de-
scribes a very broad category of persons who are permitted to main-
tain an action for damages resulting from monopolistic conduct in
trade or commerce.”208  The Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in Ar-
thur reinforces not only the court’s broad construction of the NCPA,
but also the plain text interpretation of section 59-1609: “Any person”
injured by the substantive provisions of the NCPA can sue in Ne-
braska courts.
Assuming the protective scope of the NCPA is applied broadly to
include shoplifters, the plaintiff-shoplifter must also establish actual
injury caused by the unfair or deceptive act.209  The injury require-
ment is certainly satisfied where the individual pays the amount de-
manded, but such payment is not necessary to proceed under the
Act.210  Though Nebraska law provides minimal guidance on the in-
204. Id. Section 59-829 provides in full:
When any provision of sections 59-801 to 59-831 and sections 84-211 to
84-214 or any provision of Chapter 59 is the same as or similar to the
language of a federal antitrust law, the courts of this state in construing
such sections or chapter shall follow the construction given to the federal
law by the federal courts.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-829 (Reissue 2010).
205. Arthur, 267 Neb. at 591, 676 N.W.2d at 33 (citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977) (holding indirect purchasers do have standing to sue under the
Sherman Act)).
206. Id. at 594, 676 N.W.2d at 35.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1609 (Reissue 2010) (requiring a plaintiff to be one “who is
injured in his or her business or property by a violation of sections 59-1602 to 59-
1606”).  It is worth noting that at least one jurisdiction views the injury not as a
separate requirement for standing, but rather as one element of a consumer pro-
tection claim. See Panag v. Farmers Ins., 204 P.3d 885, 890 (Wash. 2009) (“As
this court stated in Hangman Ridge, a ‘successful plaintiff’ is ‘one who establishes
all five elements of a private CPA action.’  We will not adopt a sixth element,
requiring proof of a consumer transaction between the parties, under the guise of
a separate standing inquiry.” (citation omitted)).
210. See Panag, 204 P.3d at 902 (“To establish injury and causation in a CPA claim, it
is not necessary to prove one was actually deceived.  It is sufficient to establish
the deceptive act or practice proximately caused injury to the plaintiff’s ‘business
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jury requirement in the context of the NCPA,211 it is well accepted
that a qualifying injury is sustained if “the consumer’s property inter-
est or money is diminished because of the unlawful conduct, even if
the expenses caused by the statutory violation are minimal.”212
Under this framework, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized
cognizable injury where the plaintiff lost enjoyment in or sustained
damage to property,213 incurred expense in investigating the vali-
dity of a claim,214 paid an attorney to defend the claim,215 incurred
or property.’  If the deceptive act actually induces a person to remand payment
that is not owed, that will, of course, constitute injury.”).
211. The Act provides only that the injury must be to “his or her business or property.”
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1609.
212. 1 HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES AND
CREDIT REGULATION § 136 (2015); see also Wiginton v. Pac. Credit Corp., 634 P.2d
111, 118–19 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981) (“[Defendant] argues that the de minimus dam-
ages asserted by [plaintiff] should not qualify as the damages required to main-
tain an action under [the consumer protection act].  However, the legislature was
aware that damages might be de minimus in a consumer protection action and
specifically provided for the $1,000.00 award or triple damages to cover that pos-
sibility.”); Panag, 204 P.3d at 899 (“[T]he injury requirement is met upon proof
the plaintiff’s ‘property interest or money is diminished because of the unlawful
conduct even if the expenses caused by the statutory violation are minimal.’”);
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins., 719 P.2d 531, 539
(Wash. 1986) (“The injury involved need not be great, but it must be
established.”).
213. Josey v. Filene’s, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D. Conn. 2002) (claim for “ascertainable
loss of money or property” was stated under Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
Act by allegation that department store security guards deprived patron of use of
his validly purchased personal property for forty-five minutes); Hall v. Walter,
969 P.2d 224, 237 (Colo. 1998) (“For the reasons discussed above, we hold that
property is a legally protected interest under the CCPA and that a plaintiff may
recover under [the consumer protection act] for injury to property and property
value provided that the plaintiff satisfies each element of the standard for a pri-
vate CCPA cause of action announced in this opinion.”); Tallmadge v. Aurora
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 605 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Wash. App. Ct. 1979) (“Although
the trial judge did not award Tallmadge pecuniary damages, the record indicates
that he suffered injuries for purposes of the Consumer Protection Act in that he
was inconvenienced, deprived of the use and enjoyment of his property, and re-
ceived an automobile with defects needing repair.”).
214. Panag, 204 P.3d 885 (injury established where plaintiff alleged expenses in-
curred in dispelling her uncertainty about the legal ramifications of the subroga-
tion claim, which included out-of-pocket expenses for postage, parking, and
consulting an attorney).
215. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Updegrave, 656 P.2d 1130 (Wash. App. Ct. 1983).
This case originally involved a suit by an insurance company against an insured.
Id. at 1130.  The insured filed a counterclaim under the state’s consumer protec-
tion act alleging deceptive business practices. Id. The insurance company con-
tended that the insured did not suffer any specific monetary damage as a result
of its business practice and was therefore not entitled to relief.  The court dis-
agreed, noting “the trial court found a reasonable amount for LAD’s attorney’s
fees in defending this suit and prosecuting its counterclaim . . . . To say that LAD
has not been damaged for purposes of the Consumer Protection Act is to ignore
the obvious.” Id. at 1134.
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an out-of-pocket loss,216 or where the claim affected one’s credit
rating.217
It is unlikely, however, that a Nebraska court would recognize cog-
nizable injury if premised exclusively on mental distress, embarrass-
ment, or inconvenience.  The NCPA is construed in a manner that is
consistent with analogous federal antitrust law;218 and pursuant to
section 15 of the Clayton Act219—the NCPA’s federal analog—cogni-
zable injury is limited to the plaintiff’s commercial or economic inter-
ests.220  Consequently, several jurisdictions with similar or identical
consumer protection statutes to Nebraska’s have dismissed or other-
wise rejected claims involving non-pecuniary injury.221
b. Unfair or Deceptive Business Practice
While neither the Act nor the Nebraska Supreme Court has de-
fined “unfair” or “deceptive,” the Nebraska Court of Appeals—in Rein-
brecht v. Walgreens Co.—defined the terms as follows:
[A]n unfair trade practice is one that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or un-
scrupulous. . . . [A] deceptive practice is one which possesses the tendency or
capacity to mislead, or creates the likelihood of deception, . . . fraud, misrepre-
sentation, and similar conduct are examples of what is prohibited.222
It is difficult to know how—or if—a Nebraska court would apply
these definitions in determining whether a particular civil shoplifting
demand letter was unfair or deceptive.  Similar challenges in other
contexts, however, suggest that sending overreaching demand letters
216. See Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 933 A.2d 942, 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007), aff’d and remanded, 964 A.2d 741 (N.J. 2009).
217. Panag, 204 P.3d at 897. But see Paul v. Providence Health Sys., 273 P.3d 106,
115 (Or. 2012) (holding that credit monitoring costs to protect against possible
future harm was not covered by the state’s consumer protection act because the
financial expenditure was not based on any present harm to the plaintiffs’ eco-
nomic interest).
218. NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-829 (Reissue 2010).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
220. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972); see also Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (“We simply give the word ‘property’ the indepen-
dent significance to which it is entitled in this context.  A consumer whose money
has been diminished by reason of an antitrust violation has been injured ‘in
his . . . property’ within the meaning of § 4.”).
221. See Krisa v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 113 F. Supp. 2d 694 (M.D. Penn
2000) (holding the state’s consumer protection statute provides no relief for anxi-
ety, emotional distress, depression, and aggravation of physical illness);  Rollins,
Inc. v. Butland, 951 So. 2d 860 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding the state’s
consumer protection statute does not provide for the recovery of nominal dam-
ages, speculative losses, or compensation for subjective feelings of disappoint-
ment); Jones v. Sportelli, 399 A.2d 1047 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) (rejecting
claim for damages based on pain and suffering under consumer protection statute
permitting recovery for loss of money or property); Keyes v. Bollinger, 640 P.2d
1077, 1085 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
222. Reinbrecht v. Walgreens Co., 16 Neb. App. 108, 115, 742 N.W.2d 243, 249 (2007).
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is deceptive in nature, particularly when there is a wide disparity in
resources and legal sophistication between the parties as is often the
case in this setting.
In Raad v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,223 the federal district court for
the District of Nebraska, in interpreting the NCPA, noted, “[W]hat is
an ‘unfair [or deceptive] trade practice’ is ‘largely [left] to the courts to
decide on a case-by-case basis.’”224  The court stated that one critically
important factor is the posture and sophistication of the parties in-
volved.225  That is, the NCPA should be interpreted narrowly when
the underlying dispute is between two sophisticated merchants and
broadly when the dispute is between an “unsophisticated retail con-
sumer” and “unscrupulous business people.”226  It is difficult to imag-
ine a wider disparity in party sophistication than exists in the context
of civil shoplifting demands.
Rulings outside of Nebraska offer further support for this conclu-
sion.  In Lee v. Pep Boys,227 for example, the plaintiff brought suit
under California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) after receiving a
civil demand letter from his former employer.228  The letter accused
the employee of theft (the employee had allegedly performed an oil
change on his own car without paying);229 California law permits
merchants to seek civil penalties from individuals committing acts of
theft.230  The employer initially sought payment of $325.231  A few
days later, the employer sent a second letter demanding payment of
$625,232 which exceeded the civil penalty amount allowed under the
state’s civil shoplifting statute ($500). 233  The plaintiff alleged this
second letter violated California’s UCL,234 which prohibits “any un-
lawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.”235  Specifically,
he argued the demand letter was both “unfair” and “unlawful” because
its settlement offer of $625 exceeded the statutory maximum.236
223. 13 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Neb. 1998).
224. Id. at 1014 n.6.
225. Id. at 1015.
226. Id. (citing Boulevard Assocs. v. Sovereign Hotels, Inc., 72 F.3d. 1029, 1039 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1995) (distinguishing cases because they involved “defrauded individual con-
sumers—a constituency entitled to special solicitude under [the consumer protec-
tion law]”)).
227. No. C-12-05064 JSC, 2014 WL 129171 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).
228. Id. at *1.
229. Id.
230. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.5(c) (West 2010).
231. Lee, 2014 WL 129171, at *1.
232. Id.
233. CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.5(c) (noting the individual accused of theft “shall be liable
to the merchant or library facility for damages of not less than fifty dollars ($50)
nor more than five hundred dollars ($500), plus costs”).
234. Lee, 2014 WL 129171, at *2.
235. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008).
236. Lee, 2014 WL 129171, at *2–3.
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As to the unlawfulness of the letter, the court ruled that nothing in
California’s civil shoplifting statute “makes it a violation of the law to
demand more than the $500 afforded in the law.  In other words, while
Defendants are not entitled to such an amount, the demand itself is
not unlawful.”237  The court reached a different result with respect to
the “unfair” prong of the state’s UCL.  The court—drawing on estab-
lished precedent—defined “unfair business practice” as “one that ei-
ther offends an established public policy or is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.”238
Furthermore, “Whether a business practice is unfair ‘involves an ex-
amination of that practice’s impact on its alleged victim, balanced
against the reasons, justifications and motives of the alleged wrong-
doer.’”239  Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court
concluded that it could not, as a matter of law, say that the $625 set-
tlement offer was not unfair.240  On similar logic, a Nebraska court
could find it unfair to demand any amount of penalty, where Ne-
braska’s statute does not allow for collection of a civil penalty.241
c. Trade or Commerce
The NCPA makes unlawful “[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or com-
merce . . . .”242  Thus, to prevail on a claim under the NCPA, the plain-
tiff must demonstrate that the unfair or deceptive business practice—
here, the issuance of civil demand letters—constitutes trade or
commerce.243
237. Id. at *5.
238. Id. at *3 (quoting McDonald v. Coldwell Banker, 543 F.3d 498, 506 (9th Cir.
2008)).
239. Id.  There is a strong argument that these demand letters do have a significant
impact on the recipients, who are disproportionately poor or otherwise disadvan-
taged, with little valid justifications by the alleged wrongdoer, the merchant.
240. Id. at *4 (“The Court cannot say this practice is not ‘unfair’ as a matter of law.”).
241. See supra section II.B.
242. NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1602 (Reissue 2010) (emphasis added).
243. In pleading a consumer protection claim, it is important to couch the act of com-
merce as the sending of the demand letter, as opposed to the incident of shoplift-
ing.  In Riley v. Supervalu Holdings, Inc., a consumer asserted a claim under
Ohio’s consumer protection statute following receipt of a civil demand subsequent
to an alleged act of shoplifting (plaintiff was accused but not convicted of stealing
$1.06 worth of merchandise from a local grocery store).  Riley v. Supervalu Hold-
ings, Inc., No. C-050156, 2005 WL 3557399 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2005).  The
court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, finding the taking of goods without paying
for them did not satisfy the “consumer transaction” requirement of Ohio’s act. Id.
at *4.  Notably, Ohio’s statute is much more restrictive than Nebraska’s in this
regard, specifically requiring a “consumer transaction,” and defining such as “a
sale . . . or other transfer of an item of goods” by a seller to a consumer. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A) (LexisNexis 2012).
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Though Nebraska law provides scant guidance244 on whether
sending a letter demanding money constitutes trade or commerce, a
Washington case interpreting an identical statute is compelling.  In
Panag v. Farmers Insurance,245 a plaintiff-class brought suit under
Washington’s Consumer Protection Act246 (which is identical to Ne-
braska’s CPA) after receiving collection letters from an agent of Farm-
ers Insurance.247  In seeking summary judgment, the defendant
challenged the propriety of the plaintiffs having brought suit under
the guise of consumer protection, arguing the underlying claim in-
volved an alleged tort as opposed to the “business transaction” con-
templated by the statute.248  The defendants urged the court to adopt
a rule making the state’s consumer protection law applicable only to
“consensual consumer or business transaction[s].”249  The court re-
jected this notion, citing the inherently broad applicability of the stat-
ute, specifically as it pertains to the “trade or commerce”
requirement.250  The court noted:
“Trade” and “commerce” are defined terms under the CPA to “include the sale
of assets or services, and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the peo-
ple of the state of Washington.”  An actionable violation can occur without any
consumer or business relationship between the particular plaintiff bringing a
private cause of action under the CPA and the actor because “trade or com-
merce” is not limited to such transactions.251
A Florida court took a more narrow view in addressing the issue in
the context of civil shoplifting demand letters.  In Kelly v. Palmer,
Reifler & Associates,252 alleged shoplifters filed suit against a collec-
tion firm which had mailed civil demand letters on behalf of several
244. The NCPA defines trade or commerce as “the sale of assets or services and any
commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the State of Nebraska.”
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1601(2) (Reissue 2010); see also Moats v. Republican Party
of Neb., 281 Neb. 411, 420, 796 N.W.2d 584, 593 (2011) (“Trade and commerce
mean the sale of assets or services.”).
245. 204 P.3d 885 (Wash. 2009).
246. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.090 (LexisNexis 2013).
247. Panag, 204 P.3d at 888.  The underlying financial dispute in Panag involved two
insurance companies seeking to collect alleged debts from members of the plain-
tiff-class arising from separate car accidents. Id. Both insurance companies re-
tained a collection agency, Credit Control Services, to recover the disputed
amount. Id. at 888–89.  At least one plaintiff received three letters from the col-
lection agency, each with an increased tone of urgency and threat of litigation.
Id.  The second letter, for example, warned of pending legal activity, and advised
the plaintiff to “act immediately.” Id. at 888.  The third letter reiterated these
warnings, and threatened the plaintiff with additional penalties, including litiga-
tions costs and “any other method of collection allowable by law.” Id.
248. Id. at 890.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. (citations omitted).
252. 681 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
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large retailers.253  The plaintiffs alleged, among other claims, that the
law firm violated the FDUTPA, which prohibits “unfair methods of
competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct
of any trade or commerce.”254  The plaintiffs argued the law firm had
engaged in “commerce” in its issuance of a civil demand letter that
offered the release of a legal claim—or a “thing of value”—in exchange
for money.255  The Kelly court, in rejecting this argument, distin-
guished traditional trade or commerce in the “business context” from
the pursuit of legal remedies.  “The Palmer Law Firm’s acts—conduct
ostensibly occurring during the exercise of a legal remedy—had zero
connection whatsoever to any ‘trade or commerce,’” the court noted.256
While Kelly is analogous in that it involves civil shoplifting de-
mands, a Nebraska court would likely adopt the broader interpreta-
tion employed in Panag.  The NCPA is identical to, and derives from,
the Washington statute at issue in Panag, and the Nebraska Supreme
Court has previously looked to Washington precedent in broadly inter-
preting issues involving the NCPA.257  Additionally, Nebraska courts
have allowed to proceed other NCPA claims premised upon the act or
practice of issuing deceptive letters.258  These cases not only reflect
253. Id. at 1361.
254. Id. at 1372; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204(1) (West 2010).
255. Kelly, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 1374 (“Plaintiffs contend that their dealings with the
Palmer Law Firm constituted ‘trade or commerce’ because, through the demand
letters, the firm solicited and offered them a release, a ‘thing of value,’ in ex-
change for money.  They cite Sweringen v. New York State Dispute Resolution
Ass’n . . . as support for the argument that ‘releasing legal claims for money con-
stitutes a business that satisfies any trade or commerce requirement.’”).
256. Id. at 1375.
257. Kuntzelman v. Avco Fin. Servs., 206 Neb. 130, 133–34, 291 N.W.2d 705, 707
(1980) (“[C]ertain other provisions of the Act were apparently patterned after a
consumer protection act adopted by the State of Washington.  In fact, our Act and
the Washington Act are practically identical in scope and wording, particularly
with reference to the exemption provision.  Therefore, the decisions of the Wash-
ington courts interpreting that state’s exemption provisions are helpful and in-
structive herein.” (citations omitted)); see also Powers v. Credit Mgmt. Servs.,
Inc., No. 8:11-cv-00436-JFB-TDT, at *17 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 2016) (“[T]he NCPA is a
remedial consumer protection statute that is to be liberally construed.” (citing
Kuntzelman, 206 Neb. at 134, 291 N.W.2d at 707)).
258. See Henggeler v. Brumbaugh & Quandahl, No. 8:11-CV-334, 2012 WL 2855104
(D. Neb. July 5, 2012) (rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss in a dispute in-
volving allegedly deceptive debt collection practices, inducing the issuance of mis-
leading letters); Jenkins v. Pech, No. 8:14-CV-41, 2015 WL 3658261 (D. Neb.
June 21, 2015) (granting plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in their chal-
lenge to allegedly deceptive form letters issued by the defendant-debt collection
firm); Harris v. D. Scott Carruthers & Assoc., 270 F.R.D. 446 (D. Neb. 2010)
(same).  This broad interpretation has been similarly applied to other acts involv-
ing demand for payment. See Jenkins v. Gen. Collection Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d
1165 (D. Neb. 2008) (rejecting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in an
NCPA dispute involving the defendant’s practice of filing allegedly misleading
claims against plaintiff-debtors in county court).  A jurisdiction’s willingness to
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courts’ broad interpretation of the NCPA, they suggest the issuance of
a deceptive letter is itself an act in trade or commerce.259
d. Affecting Public Interest
To be actionable under the NCPA, a plaintiff must demonstrate the
claim seeks to redress more than a “private wrong where the public
interest is unaffected.”260  For Samantha Smith, she must establish
that Wal-Mart sends similar letters to other Nebraskans and that the
recipients are also likely confused, deceived, or misled by the con-
tents.261  She could satisfy this requirement through state-wide shop-
lifting figures, statistics indicating retailers’ heavy reliance on civil
demands, evidence of other Nebraskans having received similar let-
ters, or discovery responses revealing the volume of similar letters dis-
tributed within the state, and the frequency in which recipients pay
the demand.
consider acts that fall outside what is traditionally considered “trade or com-
merce” reveals a willingness to view the requirement as broadly as necessary to
affect the underlying purpose of the statute.
259. As a final matter, an attorney representing a retailer may cite case law holding
that the practice (i.e., counsel sending out demand letters on behalf of retailer
clients) does not satisfy the “trade or commerce” requirement of a particular
state’s consumer protection act or, more generally, that attorney misconduct is
exempt from such laws.  Those exemptions, however, pertain only to disputes be-
tween a client and his or her attorney for alleged malpractice or misconduct. See,
e.g., Beyers v. Richmond, 937 A.2d 1082, 1086 n.7 (Pa. 2007) (“[The] legislature
did not intend to include the furnishing of legal services to clients within the
[Consumer Fraud] Act.”).
260. Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 258 Neb. 678, 684, 605 N.W.2d 136, 141–42
(2000) (“To be actionable under the CPA, therefore, we conclude that the unfair or
deceptive act or practice must have an impact upon the public interest.”).
261. See, e.g., Tecumseh Poultry v. Perdue Holdings, Inc., No. 4:12-CV-3032, 2012 WL
3018255 (D. Neb. July 24, 2012) (holding the plaintiff satisfied the NCPA’s “pub-
lic interest” requirement for purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion by alleging that the
defendant’s conduct likely caused confusion among consumers in Nebraska); see
also Azike v. E-Loan, Inc., No. 8:09-CV-37, 2009 WL1660472 (D. Neb. June 11,
2009) (granting motion to dismiss due, in part, to plaintiff’s failure to provide
sufficient factual allegations to establish the public interest was affected by al-
leged activity of the defendant); Siegel v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., No. 8:08-
CV-517, 2009 WL 3254491, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 8, 2009) (“[The plaintiffs] have not
alleged any conduct by defendants that involves multiple plaintiffs or multiple
transactions.  The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint is a single transaction
between the plaintiffs and defendants.  Plaintiffs’ assertion that discovery may
reveal similar conduct by defendants with respect to other mortgagees creates
only a ‘mere possibility of misconduct’ that does not rise above the speculative
level.  Accordingly, the court finds the plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim
for relief under the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act.”).
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3. Declaratory Judgment
A declaratory judgment enables a party to seek judicial direction
when there is uncertainty as to the consequences of a potential future
course of action—a sort of preventative adjudication.262  These actions
aim to clarify the rights, status, or other legal relations between the
parties.263  Federal264 and Nebraska265 law provide mechanisms by
which a party could request declaratory relief.  The function of a de-
claratory action is to determine justiciable controversies that either
are not yet ripe for adjudication by conventional forms of remedy or
are not conveniently amendable to usual remedies.266  The intent is to
provide a procedure for prompt determination of issues which, if not
addressed immediately, would subject the party to additional
injury.267
Not all disputes are suited for declaratory relief.  The pleadings
must present a justiciable controversy that is susceptible to judicial
determination.268  Actions for declaratory relief cannot be used to de-
termine the legal effect of a state of facts that are future, contingent,
or uncertain.269  Declaratory relief is also improper “where another
equally serviceable remedy is available,”270 or when the judgment
sought would not wholly conclude or resolve the controversy between
the parties.271
Although no Nebraska court has ruled on a request for declaratory
judgment in a matter involving a civil shoplifting demand, established
precedent suggests such a request may be entertained.  A seminal
262. See Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1281
(2010).
263. Bentley v. Sch. Dist. No. 025, 255 Neb. 404, 409, 583 N.W.2d 306, 307 (1998)
(citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,149 (Reissue 2008)); see also Md. Casualty Co. v.
Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941) (resolving that declaratory relief
may be sought when “the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal inter-
ests, of sufficient immediacy and reality”).
264. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012).
265. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,149.
266. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Rollins, 246 Neb. 250, 257, 518 N.W.2d 124, 128
(1994).
267. Mullendore v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 223 Neb. 28, 32–33, 338 N.W.2d 93, 97–98 (1986).
268. Ryder, 246 Neb. at 253, 518 N.W.2d at 126–27.
269. Boyles v. Hausmann, 246 Neb. 181, 187–88, 517 N.W.2d 610, 615 (1994) (“At the
time that the declaration is sought, there must be an actual justiciable issue from
which the court can declare a law as it applies to a given set of facts.”).
270. Ryder, 246 Neb. at 257, 518 N.W.2d at 129 (citing Hoiengs v. Cty. of Adams, 245
Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994); Barelmann v. Fox, 239 Neb. 771, 478 N.W.2d
548 (1992); Moore v. Black, 220 Neb. 122, 368 N.W.2d 488 (1985)).
271. Id. at 254, 518 N.W.2d at 127 (citing Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Nuclear Elec.
Ins., 229 Neb. 740, 428 N.W.2d 895 (1988); VisionQuest, Inc. v. State, 222 Neb.
228, 383 N.W.2d 22 (1986); Beatrice Manor v. Dep’t of Health, 219 Neb. 141, 362
N.W.2d 45 (1985)).
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case on declaratory judgment in Nebraska is Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.
v. Rollins.272  There, Ryder sought a judicial determination as to its
liability before any action had been filed following a vehicular accident
involving one of its trucks.273  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ne-
braska ruled the pleadings were void of a justiciable controversy ripe
for declaratory relief: it found entirely speculative whether the injured
driver would even bring a claim against Ryder (it had not even sued
the lessee at this point), what claims the driver would assert, and on
what legal theories those claims would be based.274
In contrast to the facts in Ryder, the receipt of a civil shoplifting
demand letter seeking a specified amount, identifying section 25-
21,194 as legal authority for the demand, and implying further action
will be taken, establishes a threat of suit that is beyond speculative.
The court in Ryder noted, however, that “[m]ere apprehension or the
mere threat of an action or a suit is not enough”275 and that “it is
necessary that litigation appear unavoidable.”276  Thus, it may be nec-
essary that the demand letter be worded in such a way that indicates
272. 246 Neb. 250, 518 N.W.2d 124.
273. Id. at 254, 518 N.W.2d at 127.  Ryder had leased a vehicle to an individual who
was thereafter involved in an accident causing injury to another driver. Id. at
251, 518 N.W.2d at 125–26.  In its complaint for declaratory relief Ryder sought,
in part, a finding that it had no vicarious liability to the injured driver under the
relevant statute. Id. at 251, 518 N.W.2d at 126.  The trial court declared Ryder
jointly and severally liable to the injured driver, and Ryder appealed. Id. at 250,
518 N.W.2d at 125.
274. Id. at 254, 518 N.W.2d at 127.  The court also ruled the action improper, as it
would not conclusively resolve the controversy between the parties. Id. at
254–55, 518 N.W.2d at 127.  The court found that where the pleadings lacked a
claim for damages by the injured party, another action or proceeding would need
to be brought to settle the controversy. Id. The court further found the declara-
tory judgment action inappropriate where a conventional form of remedy was
available and adequate: Ryder could defend the claim, if brought.  Id. at 257, 518
N.W.2d at 128.  The court determined that “declaratory relief is not necessary to
protect Ryder from the accrual of further damages or to guide it in some future
act.  Any of Ryder’s defenses to liability can be presented without any conse-
quential harm to Ryder if and when [the injured driver] brings suit against it.”
Id. at 257, 518 N.W.2d at 129.
275. Id. at 253, 518 N.W. 2d at 127.  The court further ruled that a declaratory action
cannot “be used to adjudicate hypothetical or speculative situations which may
never come to pass.” Id. at 254, 518 N.W.2d at 127.
276. Id. at 253, 518 N.W. 2d at 127.
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suit is imminent277 or the facts indicate efforts to collect the debt
would continue or escalate.278
Establishing an actual controversy, however, is not enough—the
facts must demonstrate the party would be exposed to additional
harm.  Citing the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Cunningham Bros. v.
Bail, the Ryder court declared that “the primary purpose of declara-
tory judgment proceedings is to prevent the accrual of avoidable dam-
ages to those not certain of their rights and to afford them an early
adjudication without waiting until their adversaries should see fit to
begin suit after damages had accrued.”279  In Ryder, the court found
there was no present controversy because no additional harm would
be suffered by delay.280  An inquiry must be made, then, into whether
and what facts may exist that establish a recipient of a civil shoplift-
ing demand letter would suffer additional harm by waiting for the re-
tailer to file suit.  Presumably, delay could result in the imposition of
statutorily imposed costs and attorney’s fees that the retailer may
seek if it files first.281  Alternatively or additionally, immediate declar-
277. Even if the letter was overtly threatening, considering suit is rarely filed in these
matters, it may be difficult to establish a true threat of litigation.  Similarly, if a
substantial amount of time has passed since the making of the demand, a court
could find the threat of suit speculative.  Of course, an average citizen may have
no way of knowing the retailer’s history of pursuing the demands or how quickly
it files suit, so any threat of suit could be reasonably interpreted to mean a law-
suit was imminent.  Another factor that may be considered is whether the de-
mand included a deadline in which to pay, and what consequences would result if
the recipient failed to pay.  One could infer an imminent threat from a letter that
referenced a statutory right to sue and included a deadline by which to “settle”
the matter.  It could also be argued that mere reference to the statute is sufficient
to create a controversy, as the statute’s primary purpose is to create a cause of
action for bringing a suit.
278. See Order on Motion to Certify Class, Lee v. Pep Boys, No. 12-CV-05064-JSC
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.leagle.com/decision/In%20FDCO%2020151
228751/Lee%20v.%20The%20Pep%20Boys-Manny%20Moe%20&%20Jack
[https://perma.unl.edu/AKL3-6B3R] (refusing to entertain an action seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the language of a civil demand letter sent to all members
of a proposed class violated the FDCPA; the court’s determination was premised
in part on the plaintiff’s failure to allege or produce any evidence that members of
the proposed class were likely to receive the demand from the defendants again,
and thus the facts portrayed no risk of additional injury absent declaratory
relief).
279. Ryder, 246 Neb. at 256, 518 N.W.2d at 128 (citing Cunningham Bros. v. Bail, 407
F.2d 1165, 1167–68 (7th Cir. 1969)).
280. See supra note 274.
281. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(1) (Reissue 2008) (“[A shoplifter] shall be liable
to the owner of the merchandise in a civil action for: . . . (ii) Costs of maintaining
the action; and (iii) Reasonable attorney’s fees if such owner has retained the
services of an attorney in maintaining the action and the action is not in the
Small Claims Court.”).  A question remains, however, as to whether a retailer can
seek attorney’s fees under the statute even when it did not initiate the action.
Nebraska law does not define what “maintaining the action” entails, but there is
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atory relief may be necessary to prevent the continuation of attempts
to collect on the demand, and in turn, prevent the harm that could
result (e.g., anxiety, embarrassment, costs of obtaining legal advice,
time).282  Even if collection attempts subsided, the individual may still
suffer indefinite fear of an “impending” lawsuit unless affirmative ac-
tion is taken.  The law in Nebraska remains unsettled as to whether
the aforementioned injuries present the type of harm contemplated in
the adoption of section 25-21,149; but, considering the principal pur-
pose of the law,283 a reasonable argument could be made that the
prospect of such continued damage could justify preventative
adjudication.
Upon facts similar to Samantha Smith’s, a recipient of a civil de-
mand letter could seek a declaratory judgment as to the extent of her
liability under Nebraska’s shoplifting civil demand statute.  The goal
would be to obtain a ruling on the scope of damages Wal-Mart could
claim under the statute, without which she cannot know the full risk
of ignoring the letter.  As previously noted, any request for declaratory
relief must resolve the entire controversy between the parties.  To ac-
complish this, Samantha Smith could seek a judgment that “because
the items taken were returned in a merchantable condition and Wal-
Mart suffered no actual property damage or loss sustained as a direct
at least some risk the phrase could be interpreted to encompass both initiation
and continuation of a lawsuit. See Maintain, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990) (“To maintain an action or suit may mean to commence or institute it . . . .
Maintain, however is usually applied to actions already brought, but not yet re-
duced to judgment.”).  Viewed in context, it appears the legislators intended to
provide reimbursement for costs and attorney’s fees to a retailer burdened by
having to file a lawsuit to recover its damages (because, arguably, if decriminal-
ization was realized, the retailer wouldn’t be relying on the state’s prosecutor to
do this for them).  When viewed comparatively to other Nebraska statutes incor-
porating similar language, it appears the legislature in this instance may have
simply utilized the wrong term to signify its intent—it used “maintain” when it
should have used “commence.” See Rigid Component Sys. v. Neb. Component
Sys., Inc., 202 Neb. 658, 659, 276 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1979) (expressing that the
term “maintain” means to continue a lawsuit that has already begun, as distin-
guished from the terms “to institute” or “to commence”).  If the same interpreta-
tion was applied to the attorney’s fees provision in section 25-21,194, a retailer
could recover attorney’s fees only if the shoplifter filed first.  Because this conclu-
sion is preposterous, the only reasonable interpretation is that “maintain” in this
instance means “commence,” and thus a merchant may seek attorney’s fees only
if it initiated suit to recover its damages.
282. See supra subsection III.C.2.i (discussing generally the injuries suffered by de-
mand letter recipients).  Additionally, a recipient of a civil demand is arguably
denied free use of her assets on the presumption that she would need to hold the
amount demanded in reserve while awaiting resolution.
283. See supra note 267 and accompanying text; see also Mullendore v. Sch. Dist. No.
1, 223 Neb. 28, 33, 338 N.W.2d 93, 98 (1986) (discussing the purpose of Ne-
braska’s Declaratory Judgment Act, and proscribing that “[t]he provisions of the
declaratory judgments act . . . are to be liberally construed and administered”).
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result of the incident of shoplifting, she is not liable to Wal-Mart for
any damages under Section 25-21,194.”284  Nebraska courts have
adopted the general rule that declaratory relief is not available to a
prospective tort defendant seeking a declaration of nonliability;285 the
Nebraska Supreme Court, however, acknowledged that the primary
rationale for the rule is specific to the unique circumstances present in
traditional personal injury matters.286
While an action for declaratory judgment may be appropriate
under the law, most letter recipients may be better advised to simply
ignore the letter due to the improbability of the retailer actually filing
suit.  Even if the client has pro bono counsel, the matter would still be
time consuming and stressful; and then there is the risk of “waking
the sleeping bear.”  Though this particular bear is known more for its
growl than its bite, the results of provocation may be debilitating,
even if the client is victorious.
284. For additional sample language, see Complaint, Renn v. Sephora USA, Inc., No.
BC551523, 2014 WL 3540591 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 14, 2014). Renn involved a
class action suit wherein recipients of civil shoplifting demand letters requested a
declaratory ruling as to the liability of the class members for the civil damages
asserted by the retailer, and further requested the retailer be enjoined from con-
tinuing its alleged unlawful practices. See also 5 JOHN P. LENICH, NEBRASKA
PRACTICE SERIES: NEBRASKA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7:11 (2008) (discussing what par-
ties may be necessarily joined in the action).  An action for declaratory relief
could be brought on its own, or coupled with an action for monetary damages and
an injunction. See Bray, supra note 262 (describing a number of claim combina-
tions involving declaratory relief).  For instance, a plaintiff could bring an action
for a declaratory ruling on whether she owed the amount claimed, a request to
enjoin the retailer from sending further demands for payment, and a claim seek-
ing monetary damages under the NCPA.  An individual without sufficient funds
to pay the costs of filing may proceed in forma pauperis. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
2301.02 (Reissue 2008); see also Tyler v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 13 Neb. App.
795, 798, 701 N.W.2d 847, 850 (2005) (confirming a non-frivolous action for de-
claratory relief may proceed in forma pauperis).
285. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Rollins, 246 Neb. 250, 255, 518 N.W.2d 124, 127–28
(1994) (“[W]e note that federal case law clearly establishes the rule that a declar-
atory judgment action should not be entertained when it is initiated by a prospec-
tive tort defendant.”).
286. Courts adopting this general rule have concluded a declaratory judgment action
would in effect permit the tort defendant to choose the time and forum for trial by
beating the potential plaintiff to the punch. Id. at 255, 518 N.W.2d at 128 (citing
Cunningham Bros. v. Bail, 407 F.2d 1165 (7th Cir. 1969); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Dent,
373 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Miss. 1974)).  This general rule also presumes the poten-
tial defendant would suffer no intermediate harm while waiting for the plaintiff
to bring the action.
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IV. A CALL TO ACTION
The misapplication of Nebraska law by large national retailers and
collection firms is an abusive practice287 and a problem in need of a
solution.  The Nebraska legislature can and should exercise its legisla-
tive powers to effect change by repealing or amending the statute; al-
ternatively, the Attorney General has the ability to curb the practice
by educating state citizens and informing involved parties about the
limitations of section 25-21,194.288  This Part analyzes and explains
how each option—repeal, amendment, or education—could benefit
Nebraskans and encourage proper application of Nebraska law.
A. Legislative Repeal
A number of factors support an argument for outright repeal.
First, section 25-21,194 is duplicative of other available state-based
statutory remedies.  Most analogous is Nebraska’s criminal restitu-
tion statute—section 29-2280—which already provides merchants an
avenue for reimbursement for any actual damage incurred as a result
of the incident.289  The statute provides in relevant part: “A sentenc-
ing court may order the defendant to make restitution for the actual
physical injury or property damage or loss sustained by the victim as a
direct result of the offense for which the defendant has been con-
victed.”290  Notably, the language in the damage provision of the resti-
287. To be clear, this Article does not claim it is illegal or undesirable to hold a shop-
lifter accountable for the damage resulting from her act of theft; rather, it asserts
retailers’ civil claims should be limited to the actual direct damage resulting from
the incident of theft and that any demand for money that exceeds the statute’s
authority is an abuse of the statute.
288. Though not prescribed by this Article, avenues exist for trial court judges to play
an active role in reducing misuse of civil remedy statutes.  For example, a trial
court judge in Florida, Donald W. Hafele, wrote a complaint to the Florida Bar
after a criminal defendant claimed he was unable to pay court costs given a $700
demand sent by Palmer Reifler stemming from the same incident. See Zimmer-
man, supra note 3.  Judge Hafele noted the letter failed to itemize any injury or
damage. Id.  The Florida Bar dismissed the grievance for lack of jurisdiction be-
cause it would require statutory interpretation. Id.  In Pennsylvania, a judge is-
sued a permanent injunction against Macy’s and its in-person collection of civil
shoplifting penalties, arguing such demands are coercive. See Debra Cassens
Weiss, Judge Plans to Go Into ‘Uncharted Legal Territory’ to Stop Macy’s from
Collecting Shoplifting Fines, A.B.A. J. (June 11, 2015, 5:45 AM), http://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/judge_plans_to_go_into_uncharted_legal_territory_to_
stop_macys_from_collect/ [https://perma.unl.edu/EBY7-M72K].  Judge Stoddart
claimed he expects Macy’s to ignore the injunction—as the store has done
before—and said he will then venture even “deeper into uncharted legal terri-
tory” and order sheriffs to take the money from Macy’s registers, at which point
Macy’s will certainly appeal and the legality of such practices can be adjudicated
by a state appellate court with binding authority. Id.
289. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2280 (Reissue 2008).
290. Id.
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tution statute, “actual damage” and “direct result,” mirrors that found
in Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute.291  Despite the matching statu-
tory text, retailers in Nebraska regularly seek through civil demand
letters amounts to which they know they would not be entitled
through restitution.  This is likely the consequence of the significant
distinction between the two statutes: oversight.292  Whereas all orders
of criminal restitution undergo scrutiny from the court, a prosecutor,
and possibly a defense attorney, written demands for damages sent
pursuant to Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute go entirely unchecked.
Like the civil shoplifting statute,293 the criminal restitution stat-
ute provides that a conviction is not needed for a court to order restitu-
tion.294  In this way, the criminal restitution statute furthers the
legislature’s verbalized intent to decriminalize petty shoplifting, while
maintaining the retailer’s ability to recover actual damages sustained.
Thus, even in cases where the alleged shoplifter is not charged or en-
ters a diversion program of some sort, a court retains authority to or-
der restitution for any direct loss resulting from the act of theft.
In addition to the criminal restitution statute, a merchant can also
utilize Nebraska’s small tort claims statute—section 25-1801—to seek
full reimbursement of its actual loss.295  The provision streamlines the
recovery process for tort claims under $4,000 by allowing a person or
entity to make a pre-litigation claim against an alleged wrongdoer for,
among other things, lost or damaged property.296  Upon making such
a claim, the harmed party must wait ninety days, during which time
291. Compare id. (“[A]ctual physical injury or property damage or loss sustained by
the victim as a direct result of the offense . . . .”), with id. § 25-21,194(1)(a)(i)
(Reissue 2008) (“Actual property damage or loss sustained as a direct result of
the incident of shoplifting . . . .”).
292. See Davis, supra note 48, at 396–407 (discussing the vast power of the private
justice system, specifically the concept of civil recovery).  “Public systems of jus-
tice are either the targets of routine research or publicly accountable actors.  Pri-
vate justice systems are neither.” Id. at 407.  Further, “Private justice systems
are accountable to the wealthy corporations that sponsor them and hence escape
routine public examination.” Id. at 396.
293. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,194(2) (“A conviction under any statute or ordinance
shall not be a condition precedent to maintaining an action under this section.”).
294. Id. § 29-2280 (“With the consent of the parties, the court may order restitution for
the actual physical injury or property damage or loss sustained by the victim of
an uncharged offense or an offense dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations.”).
Also worth noting is that although the criminal restitution statute does not pro-
vide for reimbursement of attorney’s fees (and the corresponding civil remedy
statute does), this is of no consequence where criminal restitution would be made
through the courts and the use of the state’s attorney at no cost to the retailer.
295. Id. § 25-1801 (Reissue 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2014).
296. Id.  The provision reads:
[A party] . . . in this state having a claim which amounts to four thou-
sand dollars or less against any [party] . . . for . . . (5) lost or damaged
personal property . . . may present the same to such person, partnership,
limited liability company, association, or corporation, or to any agent
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the other party may voluntarily satisfy the claim.297  If the claim is
not satisfied, the harmed party may initiate suit; if it obtains a judg-
ment, the defendant is liable for both costs and attorney’s fees in-
curred in obtaining the judgment.298  This statute, coupled with the
criminal restitution statute, provides sufficient means for retailers to
recover damage sustained as a result of an incident of shoplifting.
Moreover, these laws are less prone to abuse than Nebraska’s civil
shoplifting statute because they include specific limitations on dam-
ages that can be claimed and are subject to judicial oversight.
In addition to being duplicitous, section 25-21,194 undesirably cre-
ates a victim-class that the law treats differently than other victims of
theft (at least in practice).  As its name implies, the statute authorizes
a civil action only for incidents of shoplifting, not general theft.299
While non-merchants are confined to the remedies described above to
recover for any damage or loss sustained as a result of theft,
merchants are afforded special treatment.  For instance, an elderly
woman who has her purse stolen will, at best, recover the value of the
purse and the items therein,300 whereas a retailer could recover its
actual loss, plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees301 (and in most
states, also recover indirect costs and added penalties).  Considering
thereof, for payment in any county where suit may be instituted for the
collection of the same.
Id.  Paragraph (5) appears to already cover incidents of theft, but if the legisla-
ture deemed it prudent, it could amend the language to include “property lost or
damaged through tortuous activity, including theft.”
297. Id. (“If, at the expiration of ninety days after the presentation of such claim, the
same has not been paid or satisfied, he, she, or it may institute suit thereon in the
proper court.”).  If suit is filed, the defendant may satisfy the claim at any point
before a final judgment is entered and pay the amount claimed plus costs. See id.
(“If payment is made to the plaintiff by or on behalf of the defendant after the
filing of the suit but before judgment is taken, except as otherwise agreed in writ-
ing by the plaintiff, the plaintiff shall be entitled to receive the costs of suit
whether by voluntary payment or judgment.”).
298. Id. (“If he, she, or it establishes the claim and secures judgment thereon, he, she,
or it shall be entitled to recover the full amount of such judgment and all costs of
suit thereon, and, in addition thereto, interest on the amount of the claim at the
rate of six percent per annum from the date of presentation thereof, and, if he,
she, or it has an attorney employed in the case, an amount for attorney’s fees as
provided in this section.”).
299. See id. § 25-21,194 (Reissue 2008).
300. This assumes she is able to recover through restitution, and is at the mercy of the
government to accomplish this.  Arguably, she could bring a suit under section
25-1801, but this is highly unlikely.  The attorney’s fees provision is simply inade-
quate to persuade a civil attorney to take the one-off case.  Played out, if the
value of the woman’s purse and contents was $100, the most she could recover is
$100 plus $15 in attorney’s fees (ten dollars plus ten percent of fifty dollars). Id.
§ 25-1801.
301. Conversely, the merchant seeking compensation via section 25-21,194, could re-
cover the $100 plus whatever amount of attorney’s fees a court found reasona-
ble—an amount most likely to exceed $15.
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most retailers’ ability to absorb (or pass on to consumers) the costs of
bringing a civil action against a shoplifter, as compared to the individ-
ual victim of theft who may have limited capacity to bring suit, why is
it the retailer who is afforded the special treatment?  While address-
ing merchant theft is undoubtedly an important issue,302 the legisla-
ture’s decision to supplement avenues for relief already available to
retailers is most likely a result of the significant (largely unopposed)
lobbying efforts by national retail chains.303
Lastly, Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute has failed to accomplish
what it was enacted to do.  In 1987, the legislature identified two pri-
mary rationales for ceding to lobbying pressure and following the na-
tional trend of civil shoplifting statute adoption: (1) to provide
retailers with a cause of action against shoplifters and (2) to
decriminalize shoplifting.304  After thirty years, it has failed to accom-
plish either.  As noted throughout this Article, the statute is misused
or misapplied through overly broad interpretations by merchants and
collection firms; furthermore, as discussed above, the cause of action
the statute provides is unnecessary given other available mechanisms.
As for the legislature’s purported intent to “decriminalize” petty shop-
lifting and ease the burden on the criminal justice system, the statute
has failed.305  The law serves as a supplement to criminal prosecu-
tion,306 as opposed to an alternative.307
302. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text; see also HOBBS, supra note 148,
§ 1.5.12, at 21 (“In the 1980s all or nearly all states enacted shoplifting penalty
statutes at the behest of local retail merchants’ associations.”).
304. Floor Deb. on L.B. 536, 1987 Leg., 90th Sess. (Neb. 1987) (statement of Sen. Brad
Ashford); Hearing, supra note 53.
305. There is no evidence available that the statute has resulted in a reduction in the
criminal prosecution of shoplifting in the State of Nebraska.  In fact, reported
incidents of theft in Nebraska jumped sharply in 1987, the year the statute was
adopted, and continued to increase steadily over the next five years. Nebraska
Crime Rates 1960–2014, DISASTER CTR., http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/
necrimn.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/YMD7-YXBZ] (providing crime statistics re-
ported from law enforcement agencies; the report provides statistics on theft gen-
erally, but does not partition out shoplifting offenses).  Practically speaking, the
only truly effective way to decriminalize an act is to remove it from the criminal
code entirely; the legislature’s failure to do so upon adoption of section 25-21,194
made the ambitious (yet misguided) goal of decriminalization virtually impossi-
ble to achieve.
306. Norman, supra note 45 (describing Wal-Mart’s practice of pursuing both criminal
prosecution and civil penalties); see also MANUAL, supra note 47, at 13 (encourag-
ing merchants to vigorously pursue criminal prosecution in addition to civil re-
covery).  Even the text of many states’ shoplifting statutes reveals intent to
supplement the criminal sanctions, as opposed to replace them. See, e.g., ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8302(5) (2003) (“An action under this chapter does not
bar a criminal prosecution under Title 17-A, chapter 15.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1731.1(F) (West 2015) (“The provisions of this section are in addition to
criminal penalties and other civil remedies and shall not limit merchants or other
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B. Legislative Amendment
Unfortunately, given the strength of the retail lobby and the fact
all fifty states have civil shoplifting statutes, it is unlikely the legisla-
ture will fully repeal section 25-21,194.  Legislative amendment would
be an intermediate option that could effectively remedy the problem
while preserving merchants’ interest in recovering damages resulting
from theft.  Insight gleaned from other states’ statutes and lessons
learned from how the civil recovery system has developed suggest five
noteworthy changes.
First, section (1), which establishes what damages a merchant may
recover, should explicitly state general theft-prevention costs are not
recoverable, and that certain conditions must be met before attorney’s
fees may be awarded.  It is important to note these proposed amend-
ments would not reduce the damages currently available; it simply
makes the provision clearer.  With these changes implemented, sec-
tion 25-21,194(1) would read:
(1) (a) Any person who commits the crime of theft by shoplifting as provided
in section 28-511.01 or whose conduct is described by section 28-511.01 or
(b) the parents of a minor who commits the crime of theft by shoplifting as
provided in section 28-511.01 or whose conduct is described by section 28-
511.01 shall be liable to the owner of the merchandise in a civil action for:
persons from electing to pursue criminal penalties and other civil remedies, so
long as a double recovery does not result.”). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-
144(a) (2014) (providing that upon consent of the district attorney, a civil penalty
may be sought in lieu of the criminal penalties imposed).
307. Because the civil penalty scheme results in little to no criminal deterrence, it
could never be a viable alternative to criminal prosecution. See Regina Austin, “A
Nation of Thieves”: Securing Black People’s Right to Shop and to Sell in White
America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147, 152 (1994) (“[C]ivil process does not generate as
much deterrence as criminal prosecutions.”); Stephanie Strom, States Act to Com-
bat Shoplifting, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/19/
business/states-act-to-combat-shoplifting.html?pagewanted=all (providing con-
flicting view points on the deterring effect of civil shoplifting statutes).  There is
also evidence that retailers who have implemented civil recovery as an alterna-
tive to criminal prosecution have done so in a highly discriminatory manner.  Da-
vis, supra note 48, at 396–407.  In this study, spanning 1986 to 1988, researchers
analyzed the use and impact of a newly enacted civil recovery statute as applied
by a large national retailer. Id. The study revealed the retailers’ security person-
nel disproportionately chose not to pursue criminal charges against those evi-
dencing membership in a social class that would have less ability to pay the civil
penalty (e.g., people without an address or phone number, who had little connec-
tions to the community, or lived in a particular ZIP code). Id. The researchers
found that “[s]tore police skim the affluent for civil recovery and ship the less
affluent to the public criminal justice system.” Id. at 406.  The practice of selec-
tive prosecution is supported by current statistics indicating retailers turn over to
police approximately half of those caught shoplifting. See Shoplifting Statistics,
NAT’L ASS’N FOR SHOPLIFTING PREVENTION, http://www.shopliftingprevention.org/
what-we-do/learning-resource-center/statistics/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6VRV-
UULU] (“[Shoplifters] are turned over to the police 50 percent of the time.”).
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(i) Actual property damage or loss sustained as a direct result of the inci-
dent of shoplifting, which may include the full retail value, cost of
repair, or cost of replacement of the merchandise, but shall not in-
clude expenses related to general theft-prevention measures;308
(ii) Costs of maintaining the action; and
(iii) Reasonable attorney’s fees if such owner has retained the services of
an attorney in maintaining the action and the action is not in the
Small Claims Court incurred subsequent to the merchant filing suit
and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The owner of the merchandise retained an attorney in maintain-
ing the action;
(2) The action was not brought in Small Claims Court; and
(3) The owner of the involved merchandise obtained a judgment for
the highest amount claimed in any demand letters sent pursuant
to subsection (6) of this section.
Subsection (6), which contains the demand letter provision to
which the above subsection refers, would also benefit from revision.
To reduce abusive practices in making demands under the statute, the
law should be modified to require two written demands be sent prior
to initiation of suit, and further set forth with specificity what infor-
mation the demand letters must contain.309  This modification would
guarantee an opportunity to forego suit by paying the amount
claimed, and would also ensure the recipient was fully informed on the
matter.  The proposed language would also eliminate ambiguity as to
the amount that can be demanded under the statute.310  Maryland’s
308. This provision could also incorporate language specifically excluding “loss of time
or wages incurred by the merchant in connection with the apprehension of the
defendant.” See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:61C-1 (West 2015); see also 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8308(a)(2)(ii) (West 2007) (“Damages under this subparagraph do
not include the loss of time or wages incurred by the plaintiff in connection with
the apprehension and prosecution of the defendant.”).
309. Presently, eleven states require retailers to send a demand notice as a prerequi-
site to filing suit to recover damages (Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kan-
sas, Maryland, Mississippi, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Utah, Washington), and
in six of those states (Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, Utah, Washing-
ton) the statutes further specify the form and content of the demand letter. See
Jan E. Simonsen & Alexander M. Gormley, Demand with a Plan, CARR MALONEY
P.C., http://www.carrmaloney.com/index.php/news-resources/articles/demand-
with-a-plan-the-need-for-retailers-to-be-aware-of-the-variations-in-civil-demand-
statutes-across-the-country/ [https://perma.unl.edu/M4CP-FN8P] (providing a
useful summary of state civil shoplifting statutes categorized according to de-
mand letter provisions); see also Leiter, supra note 21 (comparing states’ civil
shoplifting statutes).  Ohio’s statute takes a different approach; it incentivizes
the practice of sending demand letters rather than outright requiring it.  In Ohio,
a retailer may choose to file suit to collect damages and penalties without first
having sent a demand, but if it sends a demand and certain notice requirements
are satisfied, then the retailer may also seek administrative costs, costs in main-
taining the action, and reasonable attorney’s fees. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.61(C) (LexisNexis 2010).
310. In its present form, the demand letter provision permits merchants to demand
damages and costs available “under this section,” and while this Article asserts
that meaning is rather straightforward, it is often misunderstood or misapplied
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civil shoplifting statute is illustrative in this regard. 311  The following
proposed language is adapted from Maryland’s statute:
(6) Prior to the commencement of any action brought under this section, the
owner of merchandise must cause two demand letters to be sent via certi-
fied mail to the responsible person at that person’s last known address.
The initial letter must be mailed at least thirty (30) days prior to any ac-
tion, and the second letter must be mailed at least fifteen (15) days prior to
any action.  Each letter shall contain the following:
(i) Information regarding the alleged act of shoplifting, including the
date, item(s) involved, the price for each item, and whether the item
was recovered in a merchantable condition;
(ii) The amount of damages sought, which shall be limited to those al-
lowed under subsection (1)(a)(i) of this section;
(iii) How the demand may be satisfied either in person, via mail, or
through a website operated by the owner of the merchandise or its
counsel;
(iv) The date by which the alleged shoplifter may make the requested
payment to avoid suit being filed;
(v) Conspicuous notice advising the alleged shoplifter that payment of
the damages and civil penalty does not preclude the possibility of
criminal prosecution, and that payment of the demand would not be
admissible in any criminal proceeding as an admission or evidence of
guilt; and
(vi) A copy of this Section.312
Thirdly, a new provision should be added to ensure that merchants
do not improperly coerce confessions or payments from suspected
shoplifters.313  It is believed some retailers coerce detained shoplifters
into signing confessions, or executing agreements to pay a specified
amount in civil damages.314  Such confessions and agreements may be
in practice: to wit, Wal-Mart’s demand of $200 despite the language appearing to
limit damages to only those incurred as a direct result of the incident. See also
supra note 76 (discussing a misinformed letter from the Nebraska Office of the
Attorney General).
311. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-1303 (LexisNexis 2013).  Per statute, the
initial letter must contain information on the act giving rise to the letter, the
amount of damages sought, the amount of civil penalty sought and the method of
calculating such sum, how the demand may be satisfied, how the demand does
not affect any potential criminal charges, and the date of required satisfaction.
Id.
312. Minnesota, Maine, and Vermont similarly require that all demands sent pursu-
ant to their respective civil shoplifting statute include a copy of such statute. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8302 (2003); MINN. STAT. § 604.14 (2014);  VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 2579 (2009).
313. Such a provision would be novel, though at least one state has by statute prohib-
ited merchants from requesting a minor “sign an admission of theft or other simi-
lar declaration unless the minor’s parent, guardian, or attorney is present.” See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-21-05(2) (2007).
314. See Jonathan Berr, Judge Says Macy’s Shoplifting Policy Is Unethical, CBS (June
15, 2015, 7:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-says-macys-shoplifting-
policy-is-unethical/ [https://perma.unl.edu/3V35-ZKG2]; see also Rossello, supra
note 47 (advising merchants to create a confession sheet that is designed so the
shoplifter can fill in the blanks at the time the person is caught and agrees to pay
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made in fear; specifically, the fear that refusing to sign the document
would subject him or her to additional criminal penalty.  It appears
retailers may also prey on non-English speaking suspects who do not
know their rights or understand the legal consequences of signing the
agreement.315  To protect against this risk, the legislature could in-
clude language such as:
(10) In no event shall any merchant cause or allow to be signed any agree-
ment or admission involving the suspected shoplifter immediately follow-
ing the incident.  Any pre-litigation settlement must comply with the
notice and demand requirements set forth in subsection (6).
Another provision could be added to eliminate the risk of redun-
dant monetary penalties.  As discussed in subsection II.A.1, alleged
shoplifters are potentially subject to an onslaught of monetary penal-
ties under the current system: an individual like Samantha Smith
may face a stiff criminal fine and criminal restitution on top of any
civil claim.  The universally accepted one-satisfaction rule316 likely al-
ready precludes a merchant from maintaining suit if it already recov-
ered via criminal restitution, but an added provision to explicitly
affirm this principle would do no harm.  For example:
(11) No cause of action shall be brought under this section, and any cause of
action already brought shall be extinguished, upon the owner having re-
covered for the actual property damage or loss sustained as a direct re-
sult of the incident of shoplifting through criminal restitution as provided
in section 25-1801, a common law claim, or any other mechanism.
Lastly, the legislature should consider going so far as to include a
hand-slapping provision to ensure compliance with the statute.  With-
out such a provision, retailers and collection firms will likely continue
the practice of misusing the statute to the detriment of Nebraskans.
Such penalty provision may look like this:
(12) If any owner of merchandise seeks recovery in a way inconsistent with
the statutory requirements and/or limitations provided herein, such
owner shall be liable for an amount equal to three times the highest
amount sought by the owner, or five-hundred dollars ($500), whichever is
greater.  Recovery under this subsection may be had in addition to, and
the charges).  Shockingly, New Hampshire law permits retailers to coercively re-
cover civil damages from alleged shoplifters by agreeing to not file a police report
or criminal complaint if the alleged shoplifter pays the amount demanded in full
(including penalties of up to $400) within sixty days. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 507:8-f, 544-C:1 (2010). Illinois is considering similar legislation. See H.R.
2496, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016).
315. See Berr, supra note 314.
316. The one-satisfaction rule is “[t]he principle that a plaintiff is only entitled to only
one recovery for a particular harm, and that the plaintiff must elect a single rem-
edy if the jury has awarded more than one.” One-Satisfaction Rule, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Thus, presumably, the dual-penalty threat would be
non-existent since the merchant could not recover under the civil shoplifting stat-
ute if it already was reimbursed under criminal restitution.
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shall not be limited by, any other remedies available.  Such action may be
brought by any party in interest, or by the Attorney General.317
Read together, these proposed amendments would better signal to
recipients, retailers, collection firms, and courts what damages are re-
coverable, and how to properly utilize demand letters as a tool to avoid
litigation.  These improvements would enhance the civil recovery sys-
tem within Nebraska and help effectuate what the legislature in-
tended when it enacted Section 25-21,194 almost thirty years ago.
C. Education and Enforcement
Ideally the legislature would involve itself and fix the problem
through legislative action, but all is not lost if it declines to do so—the
Attorney General could exercise its role as “the State’s law firm”318
and curb the problem through its consumer protection division.  The
Attorney General could act through educational outreach and, if nec-
essary, enforcement.
As stated by the Office of the Nebraska Attorney General: “An im-
portant way the Consumer Protection Division can protect consumers
is to help them protect themselves.”319  To protect against known
fraudulent practices affecting citizens, the Attorney General’s Office
should alert consumers to the issue by utilizing statewide and local
media sources, issuing press releases or alerts, or referring individu-
als to other agencies or governmental organizations.
Additionally, efforts could be aimed at educating those sending the
letters.  For example, a manual published by the Eugene Police De-
partment of Eugene, Oregon attempts to provide a blueprint for
merchants to combat shoplifting.320  Most relevant here is the man-
ual’s guidance on how a merchant should exercise its statutory right
to civil recovery; in particular, it describes Oregon’s civil shoplifting
statutes in general terms, outlines the procedure to follow, and even
details how to draft a proper demand letter.321  The Attorney Gen-
eral’s Office could create a similar manual for retailers operating
317. Maine’s civil shoplifting statute includes a similar provision aimed at penalizing
misuse of the statute; the relevant provision reads: “Fraudulent prosecution.  Any
person who knowingly uses provisions of this chapter to demand or extract money
from a person who is not legally obligated to pay a penalty may be punished by a
fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year or by
both.”  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8302(7). There is no doubt that retailers
and collection agents will oppose inclusion of this provision with all of their collec-
tive might; this is evidenced by the lack of such penalty language in civil shoplift-
ing statutes nationwide (only Maine’s statute contains such a provision).
318. NEB. ATT’Y GENERAL’S OFF., https://ago.nebraska.gov/ [https://perma.unl.edu/
3ZCM-7Q4K].
319. Consumer Protection, NEB. ATT’Y GENERAL’S OFF., https://ago.nebraska.gov/con-
sumer_protection [https://perma.unl.edu/XM23-H2L6].
320. MANUAL, supra note 47.
321. Id. at 13–16.
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within Nebraska, and those firms known to engage in civil recovery
practices within Nebraska’s borders.
If education does not resolve the problem, the Attorney General’s
Office may go so far as to use its enforcement powers to stop the mis-
use of section 25-21,194.  At first, this may be rather informal—per-
haps the Attorney General’s Office could contact those who are
misusing the statute, inform them of the correct interpretation and
limitations of Nebraska’s statute, and threaten legal action if they do
not take corrective measures.322  If the misuse continues, the Con-
sumer Protection Division could bring an action against the merchant,
law firm, or both “to protect Nebraskans and show that violations will
not be tolerated.”323
V. CONCLUSION
Nebraska’s civil shoplifting statute was developed to decriminalize
shoplifting and provide a mechanism for Nebraska retailers to recover
actual loss incurred as a result of a particular shoplifting incident.
There is no evidence the statute has accomplished either of these
goals.  Prosecutors continue to prosecute shoplifting as they would any
other form of theft, and there appears to be no program in Nebraska
intended to shift the burden of prosecuting these claims from law en-
forcement to the retailer.  Instead of creating an avenue for recovery of
actual damages incurred by the retailer, it has inadvertently created a
revenue stream for retailers and collection firms demanding payment
of arbitrary, excessive amounts in the name of the statute.  Unless
and until affirmative action is taken, retailers and their cohorts will
continue this practice of abusing the statute and extorting money from
Nebraskans.  Individuals in receipt of a demand letter should ignore
it, or take affirmative action.  Nebraska attorneys should volunteer
their time to assist citizens in seeking judicial determination as to the
legality of the practice of those firms seeking amounts beyond what
the statute provides.  The most fruitful, far reaching action, however,
could be taken by the Nebraska legislature by either repealing or
amending the statute.
322. Although the focus of this Article is on the deceptive nature of civil demand let-
ters, the Attorney General should also consider whether the letters rise to the
level of prosecutable fraud.
323. Consumer Protection, supra note 319.
